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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past thirty-five years, conservation easements have
emerged as a new favorite land-preserving tool of conservationists.'
1. Land-use planner William Whyte popularized the term "conservation easements"
in 1959. Although voluntary private land protection schemes were not new,
Whyte was the first to label them as conservation easements and to articulate a
form for such a tool. William H. Whyte, Jr., Securing Open Space for Urban
America: Conservation Easements, 36 URB. LAND INST. TEcHNIcAL BULL. 1 (1959).
Conservation easements have seen the greatest rise in popularity since the emer-
gence of land trusts. Land trusts have been growing over the past thirty years at
an incredible rate. See JANET DIEHL & THOMAS S. BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION
EASEMENT HANDBOOK Xi (1988); Land Trust Alliance, 2003 National Land Trust
Census Data, http//www.lta.orglaboutlt/census.shtml (last visited May 15, 2006).
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The scholarship examining this tool has generally focused on donated
and purchased conservation easements. 2 A largely over-looked cate-
gory, however, is "exacted conservation easements."3 Exacted conser-
vation easements arise as mandated mitigation measures under
environmental laws and land-use regulations. Property owners seek-
ing to change their land must often obtain federal, state, and local
permits. Increasingly, permit issuers require mitigation measures to
compensate for environmental degradation or harms created by pro-
posed projects. At times, these mitigation measures take the form of
conservation easements.4 Different from traditionally discussed con-
servation easements, exacted conservation easements are not donated
or voluntarily sold. Exacted conservation easements are mitigation re-
quirements for landowners seeking to fulfill goals other than land
protection.
Although similar to other conservation easements in structure, ex-
acted conservation easements are a different creature when it comes
to landowner motivation and government involvement. The common
picture of a conservation easement is a donation or sale where a land-
owner exchanges property rights in return for long-term security for
her land and various potential tax benefits. 5 Wide-ranging tax bene-
fits do not accompany exacted conservation easements, and conserva-
2. See, e.g., Ian Bowles et al., Economic Incentives and Legal Tools for Private Sector
Conservation, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 209 (1998); Federico Cheever, Public
Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation Easements:
A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077 (1996); An-
drew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2 (1989); John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A
Flexible Tool for Land Preservation, 3 ENVTL. LAw. 319 (1997); Mary Ann King &
Sally K. Fairfax, Public Accountability and Conservation Easements: Learning
from the Uniform Conservation Easement Act Debates, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J.
(forthcoming 2006); Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A
Policy Analysis in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 433 (1984); A.M. Merenlender et al., Land Trusts and Conservation Ease-
ments: Who Is Conserving What and for Whom?, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 65
(2004).
3. Jessica Owley Lippmann, Exacted Conservation Easements: The Hard Case of
Endangered Species Protection, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 293 (2004).
4. DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 1, at 5. Throughout this Article, I use the term
"conservation easement." I chose conservation easement because it is the term
most commonly used in statutes and in the academic literature. However, aca-
demics and lawmakers do not universally accept this as the most appropriate
term. As explained below, conservation easements are not easements in the tradi-
tional sense. See infra Part III. A more appropriate name may be "conservation
servitude" because these agreements represent a type of property right more akin
to equitable servitudes or real property covenants. Scholars have pointed out this
inconsistency before. See, e.g., Korngold, supra note 2. Despite my misgivings
about using the term "easement," I use conservation easement here to refer gen-
erally to private land restrictions with a conservation purpose regardless of offi-
cial legislative terms. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.6 (2000).
5. See infra discussion Part IV.
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tion does not drive the landowners as their primary project goal. This
motivation difference elevates concerns about enforcing these types of
conservation easements.
We know little about these exacted conservation easements. There
are no state or federally compiled databases, and no guarantee of con-
sistency in structure or enforcement of the property rights. Therefore,
these exacted conservation easements represent a difficult enforce-
ment situation and bring into question their long-term viability.
This Article outlines reasons why exacted conservation easements
emerged and why they are such a popular tool. This Article begins by
looking at conservation easements generally and how they arose in
the context of environmental law and property law. This emergence is
most easily and correctly understood by examining the development of
American environmental law and its subsequent rejection by many
facets of society. What remains is a push-pull relationship: we still
have environmental goals and values, but we dislike government reg-
ulation. Conservation easements become a way to protect the land-
scape without public intervention. With conservation easements, it
may appear that we can solve all our problems through private mar-
ket-based mechanisms rooted in freedom of contract that honor pri-
vate property rights. Although exacted conservation easements are an
extension of the conservation easement phenomenon, they do not em-
body the freedom of contract associated with other conservation ease-
ments and often tie directly to regulation of property. Thus, the
exacted conservation easement is a tool that directly conflicts with
many of the goals that gave rise to its emergence.
II. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Changing trends in environmental laws, along with changing atti-
tudes towards those laws help explain the emergence of conservation
easements. Before the 1960s, environmental regulations focused on ei-
ther publicly owned lands or classic theories of nuisance law.6 The
1960s and 1970s saw the birth of more widespread environmental reg-
6. See Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public Nui-
sance: A Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB.
L. REV. 359, 391 & n.175 (1990); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity
Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for
Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1454 & n.185 (1996). The boundaries of gov-
ernmental environment authority have not been clear. Public environmental
conservation efforts traditionally focused on public lands because governments
were more confident making rules regarding land they owned. Hesitation over
potential takings claims coincided with the growth in retention and acquisition of
public lands as a conservation strategy. Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax,
Fragmentation of Public Domain Law and Policy: An Alternative to the "Shift-to-
Retention" Thesis, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 649, 659-60 (1999) (discussing focus on
federal land acquisition as an environmental protection strategy).
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ulation expanding to include, among other things, actions on private
lands. Environmental law extended to cover many facets of society.
There was a growth of restrictions on private activities including re-
strictions on what one could do with privately owned land. Regulation
and government bureaucracy grew, facing an eventual backlash with
the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Property rights advocates re-
jected government control of both public and private land. People grew
distrustful of the machinery of government and lobbied for a rollback
of the restrictions. At the same time however, Americans still placed a
high premium on environmental amenities.7 This drove lawmakers,
academics, and others to look for ways to protect land while allowing
more personal freedom of action, which led to an endorsement of mar-
ket-based approaches and a movement away from stringent com-
mand-and-control style regulation. This more flexible approach
accompanied a call for less government regulation: any regulation
that would remain should be made at the lowest, most local level of
government possible.
As governments began to reduce what was seen as obtrusive con-
servation efforts, private organizations stepped in to cover the slack.
Nongovernmental organizations called "land trusts" began to head
conservation projects in areas they felt the government was perform-
ing inadequately. Conservation easements are a tool land trusts can
use to conserve land outside of the regulatory context. Government
agencies are no longer the only entities with the power to make land-
use decisions. Additionally, conservation easements draw upon the
same sentiments that call for regulation at lower levels of govern-
ment. Much like the localism movements, conservation easement ad-
vocates invoke the narrative of local decision making.
Thus, conservation easements emerge for two seemingly conflict-
ing reasons. First, land trusts look to conservation easements when
they believe that governmental authorities are not protecting impor-
tant ecological resources. Second, landowners and other conservation
easement advocates endorse the tool precisely because it does not in-
volve the government. One motivation stems from disappointment
with the government's lack of intervention, and the other motivation
draws upon a resistance to government involvement.
A. Rise in Environmental Regulation
Federal environmental regulation was slow to emerge in the
United States. When European colonists first settled in North
America, the land seemed abundant and prohibitions on environmen-
tally harmful activities unnecessary. As the population grew and the
Industrial Revolution came into full swing, environmental degrada-
7. Bowles et al., supra note 2, at 209.
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tion became more evident. These patterns, combined with other politi-
cal forces, led to the emergence of environmentalism in the 1970s.
This Part explains this historical framework with an exploration into
the emergence of the Administrative State as a regulator of the envi-
ronment. In particular, this Part examines the shifting attitudes that
alternately favored state government control, then federal control,
and then returned to state control. This changing notion about the
appropriate level of regulation helps explain why conservation ease-
ments have emerged as a popular land preservation tool.
The Progressive Era marked the true beginning of the administra-
tive state. As never before, government bureaucracy grew. It seemed
to make sense to place decision making power in the hands of a well-
educated class of people-a professional elite.8 Rapid advances in nat-
ural sciences associated with the rise of this professional elite led to a
more centralized system of regulation. 9 Additionally, improvements in
communications and transportation linked the nation together in a
new way, bringing even the most remote areas to the general mar-
ket.1 0 During this era, public opinion of the federal government dif-
fered greatly from the attitudes toward state governments, which
citizens were likely to view as more corrupt and less efficient." States
lost much of their moral authority and popular allegiance shifted to
the federal government. 12
Distrust of state power grew out of the postwar civil rights move-
ment. People did not see states as protecting the rights of individuals.
The states' failures to remedy the problems of race relations led to an
academic tendency to dismiss states as functional actors. 13 Indeed,
the dismal race situation was regarded as a death knell of federalism,
leading Professor William Riker to assert: "if in the United States one
disproves of Southern white racists, then one should disprove of Amer-
ican federalism."14 The federal government, alternatively, was seen as
the protector of the individual and the securer of rights. 15 Thus, civil
rights advocates turned to Congress and lobbied for national laws.16
8. Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American
Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
227, 257-61 (1996); Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The
Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483,
490 (1998); see also MAX WEBER, On Charisma and Institution Building, in THE
HERITAGE OF SOCIOLOGY 66 (S.N. Eisenstadt ed., 1968).
9. SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY (1959).
10. Whittington, supra note 8, at 490.
11. Id. at 497, 500-03.
12. Id. at 500.
13. Sally Fairfax, Old Recipes for New Federalism, 12 ENVTL. L. 945, 954 (1982).
14. WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 (1964).
15. See Whittington, supra note 8, at 500-01.
16. DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM 137 (1995).
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However, civil rights was not the only realm where states were in-
adequate. Beyond viewing state governments as racist, scholars and
activists considered them inefficient.17 State governmental systems
were largely underfunded, understaffed, and operating under many
handicaps such as "outdated constitutions, fragmented executive
structures, hamstrung governors, [and] poorly equipped and under-
represented legislatures .... 18 An examination of state regulation in
the 1930s and even into the 1970s showed entities that seemed to lack
the capacity to protect environmental interests.19 The message
seemed to be that states were not doing their job. State governments
were not protecting the environment, and states did not appear to
have the money or institutional capacity to protect natural resources
or land properly. Professor Donald Pisani also argues that
"[e]nvironmental laws were far less effective at the state than the fed-
eral level, in part because the states were highly sensitive to the de-
mands of the industries within their borders." 20
Congress largely formed the current environmental regulatory
scheme in the 1970s. Population growth, escalating in the 1950s, led
to increased pressure on both public and private land and resources.
The growth in urban areas following the expanded economy of the
Post-War Era caused pollution. In reaction to these ills, Congress
passed a flurry of environmental laws including the Clean Air Act,2 1
17. Whittington, supra note 8, at 497-98.
18. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IN BRIEF: STATE AND
LocAL ROLES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 3 (1982).
19. Donald J. Pisani, Natural Resources and Economic Liberty in American History,
in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 237 (Harry Scheiber ed., 1998).
20. Id. at 261. This same idea underlies the "race-to-the-bottom theory," which sug-
gests that when states compete to attract businesses and industries, there is a
danger that the environmental quality of the region will suffer. See generally
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-
To-The-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1210 (1992) (challenging race-to-the-bottom theories regarding environmen-
tal laws). Some worry that the competition will lead to states trying to outbid
each other for businesses and industries by lessening regulations. See, e.g., Scott
R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, "Facts Are Stubborn Things" An Empirical Real-
ity Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environ-
mental Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 55 (1998). But see
Revesz, supra (arguing that there is no support for the theory that states will
become lax in their environmental standards). Although logically it makes sense
that industries would try to lobby states to get the most lenient standards possi-
ble, many businesses were actually supportive of nationwide standards. One rea-
son is that federal standards make rules clear. Another reason is that when
nationwide standards are in place businesses only need to comply with one uni-
form requirement instead of dealing with the potential of different standards in
different states. This was especially attractive to auto manufacturers that
wanted to avoid different emissions standards across the nation.
21. Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
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Clean Water Act,2 2 and Resource Conservation Recovery Act.23 Con-
gress had a new interest in the environment and transferred much of
the responsibility for environmental regulation from the states to the
federal government.
Beyond these specific pollution regulations, Congress recognized a
need to make land-use and other decisions in a more environmentally
conscious way. This led to the passage of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA")24 which requires government agencies to
incorporate environmental considerations into their planning
processes. Although NEPA officially affects only federal land and fed-
eral projects, the involvement of federal permits in a project impli-
cates NEPA bringing federal environmental review requirements into
private land-use decisions.
Also during the 1970s, Congress passed the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA").25 It is unlikely that Congress realized the potential im-
pact of the statute it was enacting. Today, this law is considered
highly intrusive on private landowners. Relying on the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, in 1973 the federal government began to
protect threatened and endangered species. The ESA calls for the De-
partment of the Interior to list species that are threatened and endan-
gered with extinction. Once a species is on the list, government
agencies must work to protect that species. This protection includes
setting aside habitat, working on recovery operations, and avoiding
any actions that will further harm the species. 26 The law goes beyond
public lands to regulate private landowners with listed animal species
or habitat on their property. The existence of an endangered species or
its habitat can lead to many new restrictions on land-restrictions for
which the government rarely compensates landowners.
B. Reaction to and Rejection of Environmental Regulation
After the Progressive Era and the New Deal, a large, intervention-
ist, national state seemed likely to remain a central feature of the
American system. Scholars and practitioners seemed to view the mat-
ter as largely settled; the federal government has wide-ranging pow-
ers to make laws and require the states to enforce them. There was a
presumption that the federal government could expand its influence
in any area Congress deemed appropriate. The Reagan administration
counteracted this trend in the 1980s with a reinvigoration of the
22. Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
23. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992k (2000).
24. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
25. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
26. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding that Congress
intended to protect listed species regardless of economic cost).
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states' roles. As Professor Sally Fairfax has described, there was a re-
vival of state authority.2 7
1. Resistance to Command-and-Control Regulation
The environmental regulations that emerged in the 1970s were
largely command-and-control regulations. These laws generally dic-
tate specific standards or technology that leaves firms with little flexi-
bility in choosing how to comply with the laws. Beginning in the
1980s, there was a growing critique of this style of regulation as cum-
bersome and unduly rigid, because it often fails to accommodate crea-
tive ideas or stimulate firms to innovate. There is no incentive for
firms to come up with creative solutions to environmental problems
when the law dictates their activities.
Command-and-control regulation can also be somewhat patch-
work. For example, the regulations control different technological as-
pects of pollution control without a coherent vision of integrating goals
and laws. The most common critique of command-and-control regula-
tions is that they are inefficient. Some economists and policymakers
argue that command-and-control regulations impose a net social
cost.28 Discontent with command-and-control regulation led policy-
makers to look for more market- and incentive-based styles of regula-
tion. This dislike of command-and-control also grew from a general
dislike of bureaucracy. Command-and-control regulations demand a
centralized bureaucratic structure for enforcement. Policymakers
looked for ways not only to avoid bureaucracies by drawing on market
forces, but also to encourage private efforts to protect the environment
outside of an official regulatory scheme.
Today, there is an assumption in the regulatory world that market-
based policies (sometimes called incentive-based) are more efficient
than other styles of regulation, and therefore are preferable. However,
this assumption did not always operate. When Presidents Nixon and
Johnson made proposals for market-based approaches to curb pollu-
tion, policymakers did not even give the proposals real considera-
tion. 29 When Ronald Reagan came into office, "efficiency" was the
catchword of the day. He immediately set to work on his goal of reduc-
27. Fairfax, supra note 13, at 950-51. Additionally, Professor Fairfax notes that the
"long trend towards a presumption of federal dominance in the shared areas ap-
pear[ed] to have been reversed, and compatibility of state and federal statutes...
presumed." Id. at 951.
28. See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Effi-
cient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative
Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 887, 888
(critiquing the critiques of command-and-control).
29. Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regula-
tion: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 20 (1991).
2006] 1051
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ing government bureaucracy. 30 He considered less government more
efficient, and he felt that his administration could regulate more effi-
ciently by considering the full social costs of imposed regulations. This
led him to issue Executive Order 12,291, which required cost-benefit
analysis of any regulation with a broad impact.3 1 This order called for
review of environmental laws (as well as other regulatory realms)
with an eye toward economic factors.3 2 This appeared to conflict di-
rectly with the goals of environmental statutes, which valued protect-
ing environmental amenities above the potential costs to business and
industry.
By 1990, many different groups, including two branches of govern-
ment, endorsed the tenets of market-based regulation. There was con-
tinued strong interest from the Executive Branch. The EPA even
created a taskforce on economic incentives. Congress also seemed ea-
ger to think of more creative approaches-paving the way for market-
able permit programs and regulatory approaches with more flexibility.
This sudden widespread support for market-based approaches may
seem unusual if politicians were to acknowledge that market failures
create the need for federal environmental laws in the first place.
Problems with the operation of the free market lead to negative exter-
nalities in the form of pollution and destruction of environmental
amenities. However, solutions to the market failures can be ap-
proached with market tools that go beyond command-and-control reg-
ulation. Economists argue that market-based approaches like
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies should be considered alongside pro-
grams like tradable permits and tradable development rights. 3 3
Beyond the simple logic of utilizing the market to correct its own
failures, other factors converged to make market-based approaches
more attractive for environmental regulation in the 1990s. Although
the command-and-control regulations of the 1970s yielded many envi-
ronmental successes including cleaner air and water in many parts of
the country, there was a growing sense that statutes were reaching
the limits of their productiveness. Industries had reached all of the
easiest targets. 3 4 Companies had made the cheaper, simpler changes
30. See Eric T. Mikkelson, Comment, Earning Green for Turning Green: Executive
Order 12,291 and Market-Driven Environmental Regulation, 42 U. KAN. L. REV.
243, 246 (1993) (arguing that Executive Order 12,291 was not productive and a
turn to market-based regulatory approaches would be more efficient).
31. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Environmental Taxes and the
Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing?, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221 (1998); Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Envi-
ronmental Law, 31 ECOLOGy L.Q. 303, 396-401 (2004).
34. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 28, at 887; Hahn & Stavins, supra note 29, at 1.
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already. The improvements remaining had higher marginal costs. 3 5
Preventing a unit of pollution now costs more than it did in the past.36
Industry, policymakers, and environmentalists all began to realize
that the regulations needed changes to achieve more stringent goals
and standards.
Events outside the environmental law realm also made market-
based approaches more attractive. As the country entered into an eco-
nomic downturn and the deficit continued to grow, people became
more concerned about competitiveness. Sacrificing industrial growth
and production for achieving small improvements in environmental
amenities became questionable. Additionally, market-based modes of
thinking arose in other areas of regulation. The push to deregulate
many industries like trucking, telecommunications, and airlines
demonstrated that government regulation could operate in combina-
tion with market-based approaches successfully. These events and
changing norms led to an increased push to incorporate market mech-
anisms into environmental regulation. Instead of dictating what in-
dustries or permit applicants must do each step of the way, Congress
and the Executive Branch began to create regulatory frameworks that
allowed for more flexible methods of compliance.
This shift to increased use of market-based regulatory tools does
not mean however, that command-and-control regulation disap-
peared. Nor does it mean that command-and-control is presumptively
inefficient or inappropriate. Indeed, even when environmental regula-
tion draws more heavily on market-based theories, a background of
command-and-control style regulation continues to operate. Com-
mand-and-control achieved many environmental improvements. The
difference is that now policymakers think more creatively about how
to regulate and are more likely to take into account economic theories
and arguments when drafting environmental laws.
2. Increased Use of Contract Law
Increasingly, private and quasi-public agreements enforced via
contract law play an important role in the control of environmental
amenities. 3 7 For example, nonprofit environmental organizations
have become key figures in negotiating environmental agreements, in-
cluding Habitat Conservation Plans under the ESA and the EPA's
Project XL plans.38 Thus, private negotiations have increasingly aug-
35. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 28, at 887; Hahn & Stavins, supra note 29, at 1.
36. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 28, at 887; Hahn & Stavins, supra note 29, at 1.
37. See Lee P. Breckenridge, Nonprofit Environmental Organizations and the Re-
structuring of Institutions for Ecosystem Management, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 692, 697
(1999).




mented, and at times replaced, the public regulatory structure as a
source of environmental protection. Americans are relying more on
the private sector to take on government responsibilities. This shift in
action has been accompanied by an increase in contracting for social
services. It is now more acceptable for governments at all levels to
contract with private groups to perform traditional government
functions.
Conservation easements fit into this framework well because they
are private agreements addressing the public goal of conservation.
Private groups take on conservation tasks that citizens may have oth-
erwise thought of as governmental tasks.3 9 The increased comfort
with contracting with private groups to take on conservation work
makes Americans more open to ideas of private conservation tools.
3. Concerns about Takings Claims Question the Extent of
Regulation
Another important driving force behind the creation and growth of
conservation easements was an uncertainty regarding government
power to regulate the environment. It was not always clear that ex-
pansive federal environmental laws are constitutional.40 Policymak-
ers seeking to protect the environment may have avoided proposing
environmental legislation for fear the laws would be held unconstitu-
tional.41 Further, some analysts believed that courts might interpret
even minor restrictions on land as regulatory takings, leading to ei-
ther invalidation of regulations or forced payment of compensation.4 2
Conservation easements, though, can achieve environmental goals
without instigating constitutional challenges to land-use and environ-
mental laws.43
If land regulation cannot protect land, the alternative seems to be
government purchase of land and full governmental control over it.
Creating conservation easements can serve as a middle ground be-
tween government acquisition and regulation. As Takings Clause ju-
39. See SALLY K. FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE 6, 255-56 (discussing changing
views of the role of government in land acquisition for conservation).
40. Indeed, the constitutional basis for many environmental laws remains shaky.
Many environmental laws are based on the Commerce Clause, yet the Supreme
Court continues to refine the boundaries of actions permissible under the Com-
merce Clause. Although the Court has not yet specifically struck down an envi-
ronmental regulation as unconstitutional, there have been strong hints that such
a ruling is not unthinkable. Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce
Clause, 27 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2003); see also Solid Waste Agency v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
41. See JOHN J. COSTONIS ET AL., REGULATION V. COMPENSATION IN LAND-USE CON-
TROL: A RECOMMENDED ACCOMMODATION, A CRITIQUE, AND AN INTERPRETATION
(1977); DAVID D. GREGORY, THE EASEMENT AS A CONSERVATION TECHNIQUE (1972).




risprudence has evolved, the perceived need to use conservation
easements to avoid regulatory takings claims arising from environ-
mental laws seems to have lessened.4 4
4. Rise-of-the-Local
Throughout the first seventy years of the twentieth century, state
governments regulated land use and the environment on private land
with the federal government retaining broad control over federally-
owned land. The regulation of private land was inadequate to stem
the growing tide of environmental ills, and the federal government
created national programs. With the growth of federal programs and
bureaucracy, many feel the federal government has gone too far, cre-
ating an over-intrusive public interest state. This reaction to federal
regulation, combined with increased ability to regulate at the state
level, has citizens and policymakers turning back to the states as the
ideal actors. As local governments evolve, the devolution trend contin-
ues to decrease the ideal level of regulation.
This subsection details the push for local regulation that began to
take root in the 1980s. This development is important in understand-
ing the emergence of conservation easements because the sentiments
behind this "rise-of-the-local" and the shift to private conservation
techniques is similar. Conservation easements are rooted in the idea
that decisions should be made at the lowest level possible. They are
extremely local and can operate outside the federal context.
The recent growth of localism has aided in the shift of attitudes
regarding federalism. There is now a push to devolve decision making
to its lowest possible level. "Localism" proponents assert that al-
lowing people to make the decisions that affect them strengthens the
44. Today, legal scholars think of successful takings claims as resulting in either pay-
ment of compensation to the landowner or an injunction on the activity or regula-
tion that would lead to the takings. However, in the 1970s, some scholars were
concerned that a court would simply invalidate an entire statute or regulation if
it resulted in regulatory takings. Id. This has not been the direction that Tak-
ings Clause jurisprudence has taken, but that was not clear to policymakers and
conservation easement advocates in the early 1960s and 1970s. The ability to
regulate land use appears at least slightly more settled today. Discussions of
Takings Clause issues are reemerging in contemporary conservation easement
jurisprudence from a different angle. Now, scholars are worried that the exis-
tence of conservation easements may create takings concerns if landowners de-
mand compensation for each "property right" or "development right" removed or
restricted by regulation. See John D. Echeverria, Revive the Legacy of Land Use
Controls, OPEN SPACE, Summer 2004, at 12; see also ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, BAT-
TLING OVER LEOPOLD'S LEGACY 12-14 (2004). If neighbors are compensated for
not developing, then it might not seem fair to be restricted by a regulation with-
out receiving compensation. Conservation easements have moved from a solution
for takings problems to a cause of them.
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goals of individual liberty.4 5 The lower the level of the government at
which one can function, the better. As regulation gets smaller, it gets
closer to the people-closer to people making the decisions that affect
their lives. Justice Scalia describes decisions at lower levels of govern-
ment as tending to maximize satisfaction. 46 Arguably, this framework
brings citizens closer to democracy and further from the republican
structure the country is based upon.
Local control has a lineage in the United States traceable to strug-
gles of historical importance including states' rights and home rule
movements. "States' rights" emerged as a political rallying cry in
1910 in opposition to what some saw as intrusive federal regulation of
daily life.4 7 The argument has resurfaced many times during the na-
tion's history. For example, southern states invoked it during the Civil
Rights Era when resisting new federal legislation that created protec-
tions for minorities. 48
States' rights advocates argue that regulation enacted and imple-
mented closer to home makes more sense. They view state govern-
ments as more in tune with the needs of the people and the land than
the federal government, asserting that local governments are in the
best position to respond to the needs of their constituents. 49 Logically
this argument applies to smaller units of government: if a state is
more in tune with its citizens, then counties and municipalities are
even more in sync.
The belief that local is best has manifested itself in many ways. For
example, politicians advertise themselves as naive about politics. It is
best to be as disconnected from Washington and the federal govern-
ment as possible. A "Washington insider" is one who does not under-
stand the needs of local people-someone disconnected from the "real
world." Growing out of this attitude, Congress cut federal regulations.
The current Bush administration has consistently curtailed federal
environmental and land-use regulation. Additionally, there have been
several movements in the American West pushing for state and local
regulation of resources. The Sagebrush Rebellion, County Supremacy
Movement, and the efforts of the Quincy Library Group serve as con-
crete manifestations of both the localism and wise use movements
that urge the federal government to reduce or remove regulations.
45. Lino A. Graglia, In Defense of"Federalism," 6 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1982).
46. Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 20
(1982).
47. See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, NEW VIEWPOINTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 240-42 (1922).
48. See generally DAVID R. GOLDFIELD, BLACK, WHITE, AND SOUTHERN 63-86 (1990).
49. Owen Demuth, Comment, Sweetening the Pot: The Conservation and Reinvest-
ment Act Re-Ignites the Property Rights/Land Conservation Debate for the
Twenty-First Century, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 755, 782-83 (2002).
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The Sagebrush Rebellion erupted in the 1970s. As a response to
Congress' passage of stricter environmental laws of the 1970s and a
nationwide economic downturn, western states and industry groups
called for the transfer of federal lands to states.5 0 The sagebrush
rebels argued that states, and not the federal government, should own
the lands then designated as federal. They sought state regulation
and ownership because they viewed the states as "less bureaucratic,
more responsive, and more representative of state and local interests
because state governments are 'closest to the people."51
The Rebellion is not a success story in terms of the states' rights
movement and localism. Although they succeeded in bringing the
plight to the attention of the public, the rebels were unable to pass the
federal legislation they desired. The federal government did not turn
over ownership of federal lands to state governments. Nine western
states did pass their own state legislation asserting ownership over
such lands, but those states have not enforced the statutes. 52 The
movement merely yielded a political statement.
Land-use disputes are such a standard element of stories of the
Old West, that it is hard to view the Sagebrush Rebellion as much
else. In some ways, it seems but another stage in the history of a rebel-
lious region, but the sentiments emerging from this movement reach
beyond the western United States. Although this was a dispute over
federal regulation of public, not private, lands, the attitudes of the
participants show the growing rejection of federal regulation and
land-use planning.
The County Supremacy Movement stems from the same ideas as
the Sagebrush Rebellion and the anti-environmental movement of the
1980s. Of special significance was an incident in Catron County, New
Mexico when federal regulators sought to protect the Gila River's frag-
ile ecosystem. 53 The Forest Service had repeatedly reduced grazing on
the county's lands in that area and, at one point, incited local rage by
calling for a halt to timber production. 54 In response to the concerns of
locals, Catron County passed the first "wise use" ordinance, which as-
50. See generally R. McGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER (1993).
51. Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspec-
tive of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 849 (1982).
52. Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming have passed "Sagebrush Rebellion" style laws asserting state owner-
ship over federal lands based on the "equal footing doctrine" loosely described in
Article IV of the Constitution. John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebel-
lion: Law, Politics, and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980).
53. Alexander H. Southwell, Comment, The County Supremacy Movement: The Fed-





serts county supremacy over the federal government for local land-use
decisions. 55
The aim of the County Supremacy Movement is to protect property
rights and to return governmental power to local authorities.56 Based
in the West, the movement grew out of a distrust of federal govern-
mental power and a dislike of what the participants saw as overly in-
trusive land-use regulations. The movement emphasizes both local
sovereignty and personal property rights. Anger and frustration re-
garding federal intrusion into everyday life fuels the movement. 5 7
The movement found its voice in 1993 in Nye County, Nevada
where the federal government owns ninety-two percent of the land. 58
On Independence Day in 1994, the commissioner of Nye County used
a bulldozer to open a closed Forest Service road amid the cheers of
armed supporters. He drove a Forest Service agent off the road and
openly defied federal control of public lands in the West.59 The action
was authorized by local ordinances asserting that the federal govern-
ment does not own the public lands or traditional roads within the
State of Nevada. 60 This declaration of local sovereignty and defiance
of federal authority stands as the most aggressive posture in the
County Supremacy Movement.
The County Supremacy Movement is the most violent of the local-
ism movements. Often tied to the rise of militias, anti-federalists sen-
timents have led to violence, including a bombing outside of a forest
ranger's home.61 The militia movement and various wise use move-
ments share an anti-federal, anti-regulatory philosophy. 6 2 The com-
mon thread amongst all of these debates is hatred of federal
regulation.
Different from the movements described above, the Quincy Library
Group represents the efforts of one particular locality asserting rights
55. Id. at 424 n.44 (discussing Catron County, N.M., Ordinance 004-91 (May 21,
1991), repealed by Catron County, N.M., Ordinance 003-92 (Oct. 6, 1992)).
56. Id. at 420-21.
57. Id. at 421.
58. Peter D. Coppelman, The Federal Government's Response to the County
Supremacy Movement, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 30 (1997).
59. Southwell, supra note 53, at 418-19.
60. Id. at 418 (discussing Nye County, Nev., Ordinances 93-48 to -49 (Dec. 7, 1993)).
61. Southwell described the violent and extremist elements of this movement, includ-
ing linking it to racist ideology, the militia movement, the Branch Davidians, and
even the Oklahoma City bombing. Id. at 430-32. While all those ties are merely
conjectural, it is widely believed that the movement in Nye County led to the
bombing of Forest Service facilities and a bombing outside of a forest ranger's
home. Southwell cites the advocacy group Public Employees for Environmental
Responsibility as having catalogued more than fifty-eight incidents of violence
against public employees, including two arsons, five assaults, and six instances of
being shot at. Id. at 430 n.75.
62. BRIUAN CZECH & PAUL R. KRAusmAN, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 5 (2001).
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to make decisions about land use in its region. In the early 1990s,
there was a great deal of environmental pressure on the forests of the
northwestern United States. New studies showed that the Northern
Spotted Owl depends on old growth forests for habitat. The studies
also demonstrated that the owl's population was dwindling. Environ-
mentalists urged a halt to all old growth logging, while area residents
and logging companies opposed any measures that would disrupt the
forest economy. Officials from several different agencies and at all
levels of government entered the fray. Worried about the federal gov-
ernment's potential actions, locals gathered to discuss the future of
the land. In the town of Quincy, California, local officials, timber com-
pany representatives, and environmentalists initiated a community-
based planning process for three northern Sierra Nevada national for-
ests. This group soon evolved into the Quincy Library Group, a name
taken from the local library where members regularly met.6 3
The group put together a proposal for their land instead of defer-
ring to the government agencies (particularly the Forest Service) that
were developing plans for the area. The group then bypassed the regu-
latory agencies and went straight to Congress, billing its proposal as a
restoration of local decision making for natural resources. Congress
passed the recommendations in the group's plan as the
Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act.64 The
Quincy Library Group's plan serves perhaps as the country's most vis-
ible example of a trend toward community-based resource manage-
ment planning.
These movements and efforts are all part of a growing insurrection
against the federal government. 6 5 We can best understand these ef-
forts in conjunction with other anti-environmental and anti-regulation
movements. Overall, there seems to have emerged an anti-national
mood. The nation's capital is perceived as far removed from the needs
of the citizens. The 1994 midterm congressional elections reflected
this attitude. Candidates framed being part of the federal government
as a negative trait, and the country accordingly brought in a new gen-
eration of conservative politicians working to cut federal regulation.
63. David Owen, Comment, Prescriptive Laws, Uncertain Science, and Political Sto-
ries: Forest Management in the Sierra Nevada, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 747, 749 (2002).
64. Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act, 16 U.S.C. § 2104
(2000).
65. There has been opposition to the federal government's involvement in land-use
decision making since the Articles of Confederation. When Congress began regu-
lating public lands, settlers resisted the move as a form of feudalism. Local gov-
ernance, however, is not necessarily less intrusive or more environmentally
sound. Although these localism movements may represent valid concerns, they
also embody a misconception about local governance. Government at all levels
can be intrusive into daily life and infringe upon private property rights. Despite
the localists' rhetoric, the federal government is not necessarily more intrusive
than state or local governments.
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This movement hit hard at many issues like property rights and
environmentalism.
The rhetoric behind these movements, however, is misguided.
Most of the restrictions placed on private lands originate at the local
level with nuisance laws. State and municipal governments are still
the entities making land-use decisions. Many environmental restric-
tions come from the state and local levels, and zoning, the most intru-
sive type of private land regulation, is now, and has always been, a
local action. At the turn of the last century, municipalities regulated
local land use relatively lightly with some building codes related to
health and safety and a few other regulations like setbacks and siting
of noxious uses.6 6 At that time, no city had comprehensive zoning
laws.6 7 Since then, however, zoning laws have grown and local land
use is now one of the most regulated areas of law. Most of these regu-
lations are made at the municipal level.6 8 Modern cities are marked
by high levels of land-use regulation and related controls on the use of
property. 6 9 To that end, "urban jurisdictions now typically regulate
most aspects of the development and use of property within their
borders."70
Despite the fact that local governance is not less intrusive, it is
generally not viewed with the same distaste and distrust as federal
regulation. Thus, either localists are misguided in their push for local
governance, or the level of regulation is not the factor pushing their
agenda. It must not really be the restriction on private property that
people are rejecting, but the source of the restriction. Reasons for the
rise-of-the-local can be found in the writings of many political theo-
rists, but none of them really serves as a completely satisfactory
answer.
Emile Durkheim's ideas describe the historical increase of social
control over property. Solidarity is the bond that contributes to the
integration of society.7 1 The most basic type of solidarity is social or
mechanical solidarity based upon social capital. The more closely knit
the members of the community are, the more likely the group is to
66. Robert C. Ellickson, Taming Leviathan: Will the Centralizing Tide of the Twenti-
eth Century Continue into the Twenty-First?, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 107-08
(2000).
67. Id. at 108.
68. Id.
69. See John R. Nolen, Comprehensive Land Use Planning: Learning How and Where
to Grow, 13 PACE L. REV. 351 (1993) (providing a history of land-use planning,
and describing the state of local zoning laws today).
70. Nestor M. Davidson, The Urbanization of Property Law 30 & n.114 (2003) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW) (citing CHARLES
HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE,
MISUSE, AND REUSE OF URBAN LAND (4th ed. 1989)).
71. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 64 (George Simpson trans.,
1964).
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work collectively. 72 As these relationships develop, the number of le-
gal rules grows proportionally. 73 Actions that break these social bonds
or violate accepted custom are crimes. 74 According to Durkheim,
mechanical solidarity "is most likely where population is most dis-
persed and [the] division of labour [is the] lowest."75 Thus, as Profes-
sor Charles Geisler explains, "those resisting greater property
regulation are apt to reside in open country and smaller communities,
places in which social control is akin to moral consensus and cohesion
rather than law."76 Mechanical solidarity is a solidarity built upon
similarities. People in the same situation, with the same backgrounds,
act in similar ways. Thus, this level of solidarity reaches its maximum
when there is no individuality. 77
Durkheim's theory may help explain why the rise-of-the-local is
coming out of the West. The strongest aspects of the movement have
emerged from rural areas. Understanding the West as the battle-
ground does not fully explain the ferocity of the movement or its stay-
ing power. Durkheim's ideas about mechanical solidarity help provide
a background understanding, but do not hold sway in a unified nation
with open channels of communication and understanding of social ills.
Additionally, these are not areas absent regulation; the regulation is
merely at a different level.
Max Weber's theories also provide some insight into these chang-
ing notions about environmental regulation. Weberian reasons to op-
position of land-use planning are psychologically determinant. The
reasons for embracing the local and rejecting the federal are psycho-
logical, cultural, and ideological. The opponents to land-use planning
are irrational and parochial. They place parochial local interests above
societal interests. 78 They exhibit phobic responses to outside influ-
ences, and in response, immerse themselves in rural subcultures
alienated from the mainstream. Weber would attribute this resistance
to a lack of education or sophistication needed to understand the im-
portance of land-use planning. 79
The localism movement is using rhetoric that is not appropriate. It
is not that local governments are less invasive; it is only true that they
are more local. The rise-of-the-local connects to larger ideas of resis-
tance to bureaucracy where we elect people who are "anti-govern-
72. Id.
73. Id. at 64-65.
74. Id. at 70.
75. Charles C. Geisler, Local Control Versus Social Control in Land Use Planning:
Sociological Perspectives, in PROPERTY AND SocIAL RELATIONS 96-97 (Peter Hollo-
well ed., 1982).
76. Id. at 97.
77. DURKHEIM, supra note 71, at 130.
78. Geisler, supra note 75, at 97.
79. Id.
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ment" and Washington outsiders. This is resistance to the federal
system and an objection to progressivism. These elements also give
rise to conservation easements.
III. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW
As the above discussion suggests, changes in environmental law
concepts helped set the stage for the rise of conservation easements.
The growth of environmental regulation was strongly situated in a
centralized bureaucratic structure. Early environmental laws empha-
sized agency expertise and nationwide standard setting. Although
these command-and-control style regulations helped curb some of the
worst environmental problems, they could not finish the job. The need
for new approaches to environmental law, combined with a growing
distrust of bureaucracy, pushed towards more local regulation that
emphasizes market-based approaches. Conservation easements fit
well in this newly emerging framework.
Changing environmental law norms only tell part of the story of
the rise of conservation easements. A conservation easement is a
property law tool. Full understanding of conservation easements re-
quires examination of their development and the changing roles of
property in American society. Although Americans place the concept
of property on a pedestal, people have become more accepting of re-
strictions on property rights and of parceling out property rights in a
single piece of land. Recognition of divided property rights, combined
with an acknowledgment that property rights are highly valued, but
not absolute, paves the way for conservation easements. This Part de-
scribes American notions of property law by detailing the shifts in
thinking that created the opportunity for land conservation via non-
proprietary interests in land.
A. Early Philosophical Notions of Property and Ownership
in America
Before Europeans came to what is now the United States, aborigi-
nal peoples occupied that land. Now known as Indians, many different
tribes lived on and with the land. Each group developed its own rela-
tionship with the land and its own property regime. There were exam-
ples of private ownership, communal ownership, rights of use that
excluded other rights, and so on. When the Europeans arrived, they
imposed their own ideas of property and land management on the tri-
bal nations. Although some nations and individuals recognized tribal
property rights enough to enter into contracts and treaties with them,
others felt that European nations could, if they wanted to, justifiably
conquer Indians and acquire their lands.
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In Johnson v. M'Intosh,8 0 the United States Supreme Court ex-
plained what is now known as the discovery doctrine. Chief Justice
Marshall explained that the European colonizers divided rights to the
New World.81 These original "discovers" acquired the preemptive
right to procure Indian land by purchase or conquest.8 2 Further, the
Court described tribes as merely having a "right of occupancy" over
the land.8 3 The American government, including the federal courts,
did not recognize that Indians had property rights of the same nature
as American settlers.
The federal courts looked to the United States Constitution to as-
sert that the federal government had rights to assert control over In-
dian land, and so rules were developed rules to justify confiscating
Indian land. Among these, "[o]ne of the most powerful... rules is the
characterization of some Indian property as compensable and others
as not compensable."8 4 Case law split land into either "aboriginal" or
"recognized" title.85 Although tribes retained many of the classic prop-
erty rights (e.g., the right to occupy, the right to manage, and the right
to bequeath), their rights were always tempered by the fact that the
federal government could come in at any time and supercede the right.
Some philosophers disagreed with this attitude toward tribal
lands. Invoking a natural law connection between all nations, Spanish
humanist Franciscus de Victoria developed theories on international
law that he felt should be applied to Indians in America.86 He argued
that aboriginal inhabitants of the New World87 possessed legal rights
as free and natural men. Based on this argument, he asserted that the
Pope's grant of title to the New World was "baseless."8 8 In his view,
such a grant should not be able to supersede the inherent natural
rights of those already living on the land.8 9 Because the Indians in
America were clearly, in his view, rational beings, they should have
been able to claim a natural right by virtue of their humanity. Al-
80. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 587.
83. Indian title "is not a property right but amounts to a right of occupancy which the
sovereign grants and protects against intrusion by third parties but which right
of occupancy may be terminated and such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign
itself without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians." Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955) (holding that because
Indians do not have property rights to their land they do not need to be compen-
sated for federal government takings of land which they occupy).
84. ROBERT CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 667 (3d ed. 1991).
85. Id.
86. Oro FRIEDRICH VON GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY, 1500 TO
1800, at 85 (Ernest Barker trans., 1960).
87. De Victoria used the specific example of the Indies.




though de Victoria's ideas did not take hold in America, he hit upon a
key element of American justification of denying tribal property
rights: to resolve the problem of Indian land possession, Americans
simply denied the humanity of the Indians. In a new world where
ideas of natural law helped shape both federal and state laws, denial
of humanity was one of the only ways to avoid acknowledging the
rights of tribes.
Colonial conceptions of the indigenous peoples allowed colonists to
see the land as unoccupied and abundant. Although labor was in short
supply,90 land was for the taking. In this New World, the problems of
the old were gone. No longer was there an oppressed proletariat be-
cause all had access to land. A passion for owning land prevented the
existence of class laborers for hire. Thus, as long as the laborer could
accumulate for himself and remain the possessor of his means of pro-
duction, capitalist accumulation and the capitalistic mode of produc-
tion were impossible. 9 1 This situation fit perfectly with the ideas of
John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Jefferson, whose
ideas laid the foundation for the concepts of both Manifest Destiny
and the "American dream."
Locke made the case for property of an unlimited amount as a nat-
ural right of the individual. Because people specifically formed civil
societies in order to protect property and create a system of enforcea-
ble rights, Locke believed there was no reason why society should wish
to diminish this right other than to protect the rights of other property
holders. Under this construction, the only inappropriate use of land is
use that negatively affects the land of others. Locke believed that man
has a property in his own person, and thus, his labor, as a product of
his body, belongs properly to man.92 Further, when man mixes his
labor with the land, with nature, he makes that land his property. 93
This mixing of labor and land essentially removes the land from the
common state of nature and converts it to individual property.94 Locke
also explained that man should be able to take as much land as he
could productively use. Thus, the key is not how much land each per-
son needs to satisfy his requirements, but how much a person can put
to productive use. If someone is not actively using his land in a way
90. This was one of the reasons behind the proliferation of the slave trade. The lack
of a local labor force meant that it had to be imported.
91. KARL MARX, THE PROCESS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION 765-74 (Frederick Engels
ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., International Publishers 1967)
(1867).
92. JOHN LOCKE, OF PROPERTY, CHAPTER V OF THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1964), reprinted in PROPERTY: MAIN-
STREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 18 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1978) [hereinafter





that society views as productive, other members of society have the
right to obtain the land as property by mixing their labor with it. In
Locke's words, a man is entitled to "[als much Land as a Man Tills,
Plants, Improves, Cultivates and can use the Product of, so much is
his Property."95
Locke's ideas were founded in a system in which scarcity was not a
problem. Indeed, he explained in his famous Second Treatise of Gov-
ernment that there is enough land for all. 9 6 As long as a man leaves
enough land for others to appropriate through labor, he does no harm.
In fact, in Locke's eyes, he has done the equivalent of taking nothing
at all. Despite these ideas justifying unlimited appropriations, Locke
explained that this ideal did not operate in the European old world.97
He applied his ideas to the New World where he saw a land without
scarcity of natural resources.98
Rousseau's ideas about property were also influential in America.
His was also a labor theory of property. He began with the idea of a
natural right, but took it to a different conclusion. Instead of arguing
that man should be able to appropriate as much land as he could use,
Rousseau argued that man's natural right to property is limited to
what he can work by himself and use to serve the needs of his family.
Rousseau viewed this limited right as sacred and believed Locke's the-
ories unjustified because they contradicted this natural right.
When humans first began to cultivate areas large enough to need
the help of others, both property and labor in the economic sense de-
veloped.99 Development in property led to the first rules of justice.
Division of land produced a new right of property different from the
sacred right of natural law.100 Society developed to protect property.
As the law of property developed, it changed the idea of property as
natural law into an irrevocable right based on society, justice, and pos-
itive law. Property became a civil right.'0l
95. Id. at 19.
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id. at 21.
98. Id. at 20 ("For he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as
take nothing at all. No Body could think himself injur'd by the drinking of an-
other Man, though he took a good Draught, who had a whole River of the same
Water left to him to quench his thirst. And in the Case of Land and Water, where
there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.").
99. JEAN-JAcQUEs ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATIONS OF INE-
QUALITY (Roger D. Masters ed., New York: St. Martin's Press 1964), reprinted in
MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL, supra note 92, at 31 (1755) ("From the cultivation of
land ... division necessarily followed . . .
100. Id. at 33.
101. Id. at 36.
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Thomas Jefferson drew on Locke's and Rousseau's ideas.10 2 Jeffer-
son's plans for the development of the United States were strongly
grounded in Locke's notions of property as a natural right rooted in
labor. He envisioned a world where individual family farms would
cover the landscape. Yeomen farmers would form the backbone of
American society. He also believed Rousseau's idea that man should
only be entitled to the land he needed. Jeffersonian and Lockean ideas
were then embedded in the Constitution and the framing of American
law. Property is recognized as a sacred right in the both the Declara-
tion of Independencel 0 3 and the Bill of Rights. The Fifth Amendment
recognizes explicitly the right of private property declaring the gov-
ernment may not infringe upon it without just compensation to the
owner.
Although rights to private property were secure in the minds of the
framers, it was less clear which entities should be the enforcers of
these rights. The Federalists and Anti-Federalists10 4 grappled with
notions of state versus federal power. The states' rights position is
closely associated with the early Anti-Federalists. They opposed the
new Constitution and resisted creating a national government that
would encroach on state sovereignty.10 5 Although the sentiments of
the Federalists eventually ruled the day, and the states ratified the
Constitution, states' rights has remained a strongly held belief. In the
end, a shared system of regulation was adopted with a federal judici-
ary serving as the ultimate arbiter. 0 6
Even after the federal system was clearly established, the federal
government was slow to regulate private landowners. There must be a
102. For information about Jefferson and his theories and speeches, see generally
MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A BIOGRAPHY
(1970).
103. The phrase "the pursuit of happiness' is commonly interpreted... to mean one's
right to own land and exercise broad discretion in its disposal and use." Geisler,
supra note 75, at 105 n.1.
104. There is confusion in the terminology here because those who now label them-
selves Federalists are more in keeping with the intellectual tradition of the Anti-
Federalists. I use the term Federalist and Anti-Federalist as originally intended
by the framers of the Constitution. Federalists are those arguing in favor of a
strong national government where states surrender some of their sovereignty for
the benefit of being part of the strong federal system. Anti-Federalists are con-
cerned about state sovereignty and usually argue in favor of strong states' rights.
See JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS xxiii-xxvii (2004).
105. HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERAL-
ISTS WERE FOR 10-11 (1981).
106. The role of the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional rights was
not obvious during the writing of the Constitution. In fact, states' rights advo-
cates intentionally kept any such statement out of the Constitution with the
Madisonian Compromise. It was not until the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the fol-




constitutional foundation for any federal statute, but the boundaries
of this authority have not always been clear. Early federal regulations
of land entailed dispersing lands. By the end of the American Revolu-
tion, many people were landless.1o 7 The land on the East Coast was
occupied and settlers began to head west. Statutes such as the Home-
stead Acts described the circumstances under which citizens could
gain land. These laws were grounded in the ideas described above-all
Americans have the potential to be landowners, and they can gain this
property by the sweat of their brow. Rousseau's influence appears in
the limited acres granted each family under the Homestead Acts.
The meaning of land ownership changed from the end of the Civil
War to World War I. The labor theory of value made less sense in an
economy dominated by cities, corporations, giant factories, and elabo-
rate transportation systems. The Industrial Revolution shifted the
population from rural to urban areas, consolidating property in the
hands of a few and increasing environmental damage. The rise of cor-
porations and large scale businesses led to a new conception of prop-
erty that "move[d] away from its land-law roots."108 One of the biggest
developments in American society has been the transformation from a
primarily rural, agrarian society to an overwhelmingly urban one.
This process of urbanization was driven by industrialization. Histo-
rian Arthur Schlesinger described the era as a "momentous shift [in]
the center of national equilibrium from the countryside to the city."1o9
After World War II, the number and power of corporations grew. This
led to increased pressure on the public domain.11O
The United States was built on Lockean ideals of private property.
Because of this groundwork, Americans view private property as a sa-
cred right. This attitude has led many landowners to resent regula-
tions they view as infringing upon their rights as property owners.
The property rights movement draws on these concerns to lobby
against further government intrusion. The development of ideas of
property in the United States logically led to the emergence of a prop-
erty rights movement. Reactions against government regulation have
led to a rise-of-the-local where property owners lobby for local and
state control of resources. The Sagebrush Rebellion, County
Supremacy Movement, and the efforts of the Quincy Library Group
exemplify this movement. Any arguments against federal regulation
are of concern to environmentalists because environmental laws are
107. Pisani, supra note 19, at 238 ("By the Revolution, between one-third and one-half
of adult white males in western Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and parts of Massachu-
setts were landless.").
108. See Davidson, supra note 70, at 12 & n.37 (citing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY
145-48 (1992)).
109. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE RISE OF THE CITY 1878-1898, at 435 (1933).
110. Pisani, supra note 19, at 260.
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often simultaneously regarded as the most intrusive to property own-
ers, and in the most need of comprehensive federal regulation.
B. The Evolving Meaning of Property
The meaning of property is ever changing. Even more complicating
is the fact that the term "property" in common parlance is quite differ-
ent from a legal or political definition of property. When we think of
property, we think about objects that we possess or land to which we
hold title. In reality, property is a complex concept involving various
rights and obligations. This discussion looks to notions of property re-
lating to land; specifically, the American concept of land as property.
What it means to own land has changed over time in the United
States. As the both population and bureaucracy have grown, ideas
about rights in land have evolved.I'
Although in common usage property rights are things,"12 to legal
theorists, property describes rights.113 The rights that define property
are both contested and ever changing. Theorists debate which rights
are most essential, but generally the incidents of ownership include
the right to possess, the right to manage, the right to income, the right
to capital, and the right to transmit. Property describes a political re-
lationship between persons: rights of persons in relation to other per-
sons. Morris Cohen described property as "a power to impose one's will
on others."1 14 Under this construction, property is most about exclu-
sion. On your land or your property, you get to make the rules. The
underlying presumption is that private landowners determine actions
and rules that govern their property. Outside their land, others deter-
mine the rules whether another private party or a government agency.
Professor Charles Reich described this characteristic of property in
the following terms:
111. See John E. Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of
Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 1 (discussing the evolving nature of private
property).
112. The term property did not always mean "things" however. The treatment of prop-
erty as things came with the growth of capitalism and the market economy. Be-
ginning in the seventeenth century, the pattern of old limited rights in land was
surpassed by virtually unlimited rights. C.B. MacPherson, The Meaning of Prop-
erty, in MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL, supra note 92, at 7. MacPherson explains that
the "more freely and pervasively the market operated, the more this was so." Id.
113. Any number of theorists can be cited for this proposition. See, e.g., Morris R.
Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8 (1927); Charles A. Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1965); cf Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J.
16, 28-57 (1913) (discussing property as the nexus of rights, privileges, and
powers).
114. C.B. MacPherson, Introduction to Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, in
MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL, supra note 92, at 153.
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[Property] performs many different functions. One of these functions is to
draw a boundary between public and private power. Property draws a circle
around the activities of each private individual or organization. Within that
circle, the owner has a greater degree of freedom than without. Outside, he
must justify or explain his actions, and show his authority. Within, he is
master, and the state must explain and justify any interference. It is as if
property shifted the burden of proof; outside, the individual has the burden;
inside, the burden is on government to demonstrate that something the owner
wishes to do should not be done. 1 1 5
One of the key defining features of property is that it represents an
enforceable claim. For property rights to be meaningful, a landowner
must have the ability to limit the actions of others on her land. Le-
gally, something is property if society both recognizes the claim and is
willing to enforce it.116 Thus, property goes beyond mere possession.
The right to determine the rules on your land is not unlimited,
however. The rights of others temper one's right to own land. Thus, a
property owner may not use his land in a way that will harm others.
This limitation forms the basis for common law nuisance claims.117
Importantly, because property represents an ability to generate an in-
come from land, one may not interfere with her neighbors' ability to
make productive use of their land.
The most common property metaphor is that of a "bundle of sticks."
This image grew out of the concept of property as various rights.118
Each stick in the bundle that represents property is a different right.
Over time or across cultures, sticks may be added or taken away (or
perhaps cut down to a smaller size). In the United States, property
law has been described as losing sticks out of its bundle over time.
Because property describes socially constructed rights, as societies
evolve and physical circumstances change, the meaning of property
changes as well. This is easily seen in the American context where a
growth in population and bureaucratic structure dramatically
changed rules about land. In the country's infancy, land was abundant
115. Reich, supra note 113, at 771.
116. C.B. MacPherson argues that property should be an enforceable claim "because
property is necessary for the realization of man's fundamental nature, or because
it is a natural right. Property is not thought to be a right because it is an enforce-
able claim. It is an enforceable claim only because, and in so far as, the prevail-
ing ethical theory holds that it is a necessary human right." MacPherson, supra
note 112, at 3.
117. See Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 926 (1999).
118. Hohfeld is generally credited for developing the bundle of sticks metaphor. Al-
though he never actually used that phrase, his description of property as a collec-
tion of rights, privileges, and powers laid the foundation for the concept. Thomas
W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Econom-
ics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 365 (2001). Although widely accepted as a good represen-
tation of property, this metaphor is not universally accepted. See, e.g., J.E.
Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996).
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and easy to acquire. By the time the frontier closed and the federal
government switched its policy from dispersion to retention, Ameri-
cans were restricted as to what they were allowed to do on their lands.
Over the years, as local, state, and federal governments grew, regula-
tions encompassed more areas of daily life. During the Progressive
Era of the 1920s, people put their trust in the hands of experts and
government agencies to dictate proper courses of actions. When regu-
lations continued to increase without expert agencies clearly bettering
the world, distrust of government decision making emerged as a pow-
erful force. This distrust grew with the rise of environmental legisla-
tion in the 1970s and the advent of federal land-use planning.
The United States is now a country with much regulation on the
federal, state, and municipal levels. Regulation by the federal govern-
ment in particular has raised the ire of many property owners. Some
property owners argue that the federal government intrudes too much
in their lives affecting their ability to make land-use decisions. This
distrust of and distaste for federal regulation has led to a growing
movement for moving decision making to a more local level.
Private property owners have lost many sticks in their property
rights bundle. In particular, these losses have occurred with the ad-
vent of environmental and zoning laws.119 There are not only fewer
sticks, but the remaining sticks are less certain. Removed rights are
scattered to multiple claimants.12o Federal regulation has played a
particularly conspicuous role both because of the dislike of regulation
from afar and the increased role played by federal courts. As noted by
rural sociologist Charles Geisler, "[als regulation increases, land as-
sumes new meanings. So too, does the bedrock institution of property
itself."'12
While increasing population and accompanying urbanization led to
more regulation, it also created an atmosphere where Americans were
detached from land. Jefferson's vision of yeoman farmers working the
land is far from today's reality. The federal government owns one-
third of America's land. The family farm is nearly extinct-large cor-
porations run the farming industry. The majority of Americans do not
live in rural areas nor do they work with the land; most Americans
live in cities and work in the capitalist economy. Although most Amer-
icans are concerned with clean air, clean water, and living healthy
lives, laws infringing on land-use activities do not appear to touch the
119. Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, The Destructive Role of Land Use Plan-
ning, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 103-04 (2000).
120. Id. at 107-08. This scattering of sticks also leads to higher transactions costs. As
explained by Ronald Coase in his famous article, transactions costs lead to ineffi-
ciencies in regulation and bargaining. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 15-19 (1960).
121. Geisler, supra note 75, at 96.
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lives of most of us. We do not feel that we have lost control over the
right to develop our land because we do not own land. Even urban
homeowners are not very affected by federal restrictions. People wish-
ing to change their land through farming or development feel the re-
strictions more immediately.
This objection to regulation of private property is inappropriate
and not in keeping with the history of the United States. Private prop-
erty is the result of government largess. 1 22 The government deter-
mines and regulates property-it makes private property possible.
The government has always regulated private property in this coun-
try. The Constitution may protect some property rights, but it also
asserts the right of government to tax private property and the Fifth
Amendment lays out the right of eminent domain. Property rights ac-
tually come from the state, and, thus, the state should be free to delin-
eate what those rights should be. The ultimate justification for private
property should be the good of society.
In the end, notions of property depend upon the narratives in-
voked. The rise-of-the-local is built upon a story of freedom. The move-
ment's narrative involves an image of the yeoman farmer working his
land building a future for his family. This is the essence of the Ameri-
can dream. This image does not operate alone, however, but includes
the sense of property giving someone an individual right: Americans
are free individuals working land the way they want to work it. The
idea of property as a social good smacks of communism. The mere
mention of society and regulation leads to unmerited theories of com-
munist intervention and the disruption of the American capitalist sys-
tem. In reality, the regulated American system is the foundation of
our capitalist economy. The real way to understand this rejection of
the federal government is to listen to the stories being told. Tradi-
tional Eurocentric upper class, rural ideas of unlimited public re-
sources open to all are guiding the rhetoric despite their inaccuracies
and ignorance of history.
IV. EMERGENCE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
Increasing population and development pressures have led to envi-
ronmental degradation and loss of open space. 123 In the search for so-
lutions to these problems, ways to restrict private property have
developed.124 Much of this conservation work has been done via land-
122. Reich, supra note 113.
123. This problem has been oft-studied and remarked upon. For a specific discussion
in the context of the land conservation movement, see RICHARD BREWER, CONSER-
VANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 13 (2003).
124. Many books and articles discuss the emergence of new land preservation tools
and creative property arrangements in response to increased environmental deg-
radation. See, e.g., id.; LAND SAVING ACTION (Russell L. Brenneman & Sarah M.
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use and environmental regulations coming from all levels of govern-
ment. Some conservationists, however, have looked to a much older
area of law: the law of servitudes. Servitudes enable private agree-
ments restricting land use, often creating arrangements that last far
into the future. The common law of servitudes offers three tools for
restricting land for conservation purposes: easements, real covenants,
and equitable servitudes. Planners and conservationists drew on all
three of these to protect environmental values, but found them all
lacking in some way. To satisfy the goals that traditional servitudes
could not achieve, policymakers created a new property tool in conser-
vation easements.
A recognition of development pressures combined with a desire to
continue development led planners to look for more flexible tools that
could work within the development context. Additionally, a dislike of
public regulation pushed nonprofit organizations to explore routes
that are more private. One of the key elements of American law is the
"freedom of contract." As a people, we uphold our right to make pri-
vate agreements. This is a form of autonomy where we assert our
right to make decisions regarding what we own, whether that be our
labor or our property. Growing out of this freedom of contract is the
idea that we have the ability to make long-term agreements regarding
our land. These combined sentiments paved the path for private land-
use restriction agreements like conservation easements.
Conservation easements appear to be a promising solution to the
dilemma of balancing private development and conservation interests.
When landowners willingly enter into conservation easement transac-
tions with private land conservation organizations, the exchange ap-
pears to avoid the unpleasantness of a government land-use
regulation. Such conservation easements are agreements entered into
willingly and, at times, even enthusiastically. Landowners can donate
or sell a conservation easement to a local land trust, keeping the
transaction both local and out of government hands. 12 5 This absence
of governmental involvement is one of the chief benefits of donated
and sold conservation easements noted by scholars. 1 26
Not only do conservation easements represent decisions that take
the government out of the process, but they are also done at a local
level. An individual can turn to a local land trust comprised of people
he knows or at least people from his community. By preserving land
Bates eds., 1984); PRIVATE OPTIONS: TOOLS AND CONCEPTS FOR LAND CONSERVA-
TION (Mont. Land Reliance & Land Trust Exch. eds., 1982).
125. Conservation easements often have governmental ties because of funding, but
these are not necessarily felt directly by the landowner.
126. See, e.g., James Boyd et al., The Law and Economics of Habitat Conservation:




locally and making workable long-term conservation strategies, some
conservation easement proponents believe they can stave off federal
land-use regulation. It is not a direct tradeoff, of course; there are no
G-men sitting at the door saying, "Donate a conservation easement, or
we will regulate your land." It is more removed than that. If conserva-
tion policies are going well, and people feel that there is open space
and healthy habitats, the G-men never even come to town.
Conservation easements are flexible tools. As private agreements,
they can be tailored to meet the needs of the parties. A landowner can
decide what type of restriction is palatable while the conservation
group can delineate exactly what it feels needs to be conserved. This
can be done on an easement-by-easement basis instead of using broad-
based land control rules. As agreements between private parties,
changes to conservation easements can also be negotiated privately.
Most conservation easements allow the parties to the agreement to
review the instrument and make changes if appropriate. Landowners
may feel that the potential to modify later makes conservation ease-
ments attractive. If they trust the group they are working with, they
may trust them to be reasonable in the future. If these are agreements
amongst neighbors, the parties can turn to each other to work out so-
lutions to problems that may arise. Such negotiation and restructur-
ing would not be possible with governmental regulation.
Conservation easements grow directly out of the distinctly Ameri-
can view of property. The previous Part detailed property as a concept
in the United States, illustrating our unique ties to property and the
American concept of ownership. The Part began with the pre-conquest
attitudes to show how deeply embedded these notions are and how
they shaped our society and our property law. The narrative continued
to describe our current ideas of property and show how conservation
easements are a logical outgrowth of our property law framework.
The remainder of this Part discusses the details of conservation
easements. This discussion begins by reviewing the common law rules
regarding servitudes. These rules explain the legal circumstances sur-
rounding the emergence of conservation easements. To understand
why preservationists felt conservation easements were needed, it is
necessary to know what was in place before. After briefly summariz-
ing common law servitudes, this Part continues by explaining what
Americans could not do in the context of the readily available tools.
Mostly, negotiators were concerned with stability: Were the agree-
ments enforceable? Assignable? Because of a lack of clarity on these
issues, policymakers created conservation easement statutes. Thus,
after detailing the remaining gaps, the Part describes the creation of
conservation easements under the current legal framework.
Conservation easements are a culmination of the areas discussed
earlier in this Article. Conservation easements fit well within the con-
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text of changing notions about property and environmental law. Hav-
ing explained why we have conservation easements, this Article now
turns to the details about conservation easements, examining their
benefits in particular. These benefits help explain why conservation
easements are so popular.12 7 This background sets the stage for the
next Part, which looks specifically at exacted conservation easements
and how they emerged from the more traditional conservation
easements.
A. Common Law Rules Regarding Private Land Protection
Agreements
In Roman law, private agreements restricting land were known as
servitudes.128 English law borrowed the term and device from the Ro-
mans, and American law inherited it from the English.129 Generally,
servitudes are rights to affect another's use and enjoyment of his or
her land and are "a central contribution to the world of private order-
ing."13 0 Professor Susan French describes servitudes as a way to "tie
rights and obligations to land ownership or occupancy so that, without
any further agreement, successors to the land take it with the benefits
and burdens of the servitude arrangement."' 3 1 Under traditional com-
mon law rules, there are three categories of servitudes: easements,
real covenants, and equitable servitudes.13 2 These three divisions de-
veloped in the nineteenth century, and thus are relatively recent, even
though the general concept of private land restriction agreements
dates back to Roman law.133 All three of these tools have been used at
different times and in different ways. This section explains these three
tools, and the next section describes why they are inadequate for con-
servation, leading to the creation of conservation easement statutes.
127. Although there are also many concerns associated with conservation easements, I
do not address them in this Article. Here I am interested in the benefits side of
the equation. Not only do the benefits and perceived benefits give rise to conser-
vation easements and explain their growing popularity, but these benefits can
also be directly contrasted with benefits of exacted conservation easements.
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 cmt. a (2000).
129. Id.
130. Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Crea-
tion Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 928, 928 (1988).
131. Id. (further explaining servitudes as ways to make "permanent changes in the
default allocations of rights and obligations" to land). However, servitudes are
not necessarily permanent; they may be of limited duration.
132. These three types of servitudes represent broad, general categories that may be
used for conservation purposes. More specific types of servitudes can be divided
out and described separately. Susan French explains that depending on how you
count them, up to fourteen categories of servitudes operate in American and En-
glish law. Id. at 933.




One of the oldest methods of restricting land is an easement.
Black's Law Dictionary defines an "easement" as:
an interest in land owned by another person, consisting in the right to use or
control the land, or an area above or below it, for a specific limited purpose....
Unlike a lease or license, an easement may last forever, but it does not give
the holder the right to possess, take from, improve, or sell the land.134
Some common forms of easements are rights of way, rights of entry,
rights to the support of land and buildings, rights of light and air, and
rights to place or keep something on an adjacent piece of land.135 Im-
portantly, easements are not possessory interests in land.
Any examination of an easement begins with two essential ques-
tions: (i) is the easement affirmative or negative;136 and (ii) is it ap-
purtenant or in gross. Affirmative easements explain what an
individual may do.137 They describe a right existing in someone other
than the owner of the present possessory estate. Essentially, affirma-
tive easements entitle the easement holder to perform an affirmative
act on the possessory owner's estate. Negative easements, alterna-
tively, describe a prohibition. Negative easements prohibit someone
from doing something on her land that would otherwise be permissi-
ble.13s The holder of the negative easement then has the right and
ability to enforce the restriction.
Traditionally, courts only upheld affirmative easements and spe-
cialized categories of negative easements. English law only recognized
four things negative easements could protect: (i) light; (ii) air; (iii) sub-
jacent or lateral support; and (iv) "flow of an artificial stream."139
134. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 548 (8th ed. 2004).
135. See generally JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 723-49 (1998) (discussing basic con-
cepts regarding easements).
136. British law also recognized a third category of "spurious" easements. Under En-
glish law, the benefit of an easement could not be held in gross unless specifically
permitted by statute. When permitted, such easements were called "spurious
easements." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 cmt. a (2000).
137. There is a special category of affirmative easements that describe rights to take
something off or from land. These are called profits A prendre. These create rights
to enter and use land in possession of another, but only in order to remove some-
thing from the land. Examples include rights to remove timber, minerals, and
game, rights to cut wood, and rights to pasture cattle. Id. Some scholars and
courts consider profits A prendre to be a type of easement, and others consider
profits & prendre to be a separate category of servitudes. DWYER & MENELL,
supra note 135, at 723 n.1.
138. The latest Restatement of Property for servitudes has done away with the cate-
gory of negative easements, calling them instead "real covenants." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 cmts. b & h (2000). I treat real covenants as a
separate category of servitudes as described below in subsection III.A.2.
139. See DWYER & MENELL, supra note 135, at 724 (explaining that "[alt common law,
and in virtually all states today, the only negative easements are for light, air,
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American courts have expanded these categories in only very limited
ways, adding, for example, easements preventing neighbors from
blocking a view or obstructing sunlight to solar panels.14o
After determining whether the easement in question is affirmative
or negative, the next quality to examine is whether the easement is
"appurtenant" or "in gross." Obligations that are connected to the
land, instead of to a specific person, are appurtenant. The land subject
to the easement is the "servient estate."'141 The land benefited by the
easement is the "dominant estate."142 Using the example of a negative
easement preventing obstruction of light, the owner of the servient
estate may not block the windows on the dominant estate. The restric-
tion remains in place even if the dominant estate changes hands.
Thus, whoever owns the dominant estate enjoys the benefit of the ap-
purtenant negative easement.1 43 Correspondingly, whoever owns the
servient estate carries the burden of the negative easement. If an
easement is not appurtenant, it is in gross, which means that the ben-
efit is associated with a particular person or entity. Easements in
gross describe rights not associated with the person who owns a par-
ticular parcel; they create a personal right related to the land in an-
other individual.14 4 The holder of the easement is not defined by that
person's ownership of land.
In English law, an easement could not be created or held in
gross.145 American courts also favor appurtenant easements over
easements in gross, and where an easement instrument is ambiguous,
courts will interpret it as an appurtenant easement.146 Importantly,
lateral support, and flow of an artificial stream" and that "American courts, in
contrast to their English counterparts, have shown greater flexibility in stretch-
ing these categories").
140. Dana & Ramsey, supra note 2, at 13 (explaining some modern day expansions of
air and light easements to protecting views and access to sunlight for solar
panels); see also Petersen v. Friedman, 328 P.2d 264 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (af-
firming judgment in favor of easement holder's action to enjoin adjacent landown-
ers from violating the easement by erecting antennae). The list of negative
easements is limited largely because similar goals can be met using other struc-
tures. Almost all types of negative easements can be treated as promises by a
servant owner not to use his land in a certain way. Courts have not found it
necessary to expand the categories of permissible negative easements because
they can classify the right to prevent a neighbor from doing something on his
land as an equitable servitude. Equitable servitudes are discussed infra in sub-
section III.A.3.





145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 cmt. a (2000).
146. See, e.g., Martin v. Music, 254 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1953); Burcky v. Knowles, 413
A.2d 585 (N.H. 1980); Mrantha Settlement Ass'n v. Evans, 122 A.2d 679 (Pa.
1956); Mitchell v. Castellaw, 246 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. 1952); Green v. Lupo, 647 P.2d
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they may or may not allow transfer of easements in gross. Although
easements in gross are clearly not assignable under English law,
American law is a bit more opaque, with states reaching differing re-
sults on the question of assignability.147
There are three ways to enforce an easement. First, the easement
holder may sue at law for monetary damages. Second, the easement
holder may seek equitable relief in the form an injunction.148 Third, in
some cases, easement holders may turn to self-help and personally re-
move obstacles to an easement.
There are several ways to terminate an easement. The most
straightforward is by agreement of the parties involved (the easement
holder and the owner of the servient estate). Often easement instru-
ments delineate termination rules, agreeing, for example, to termi-
nate after a period of time, or after the occurrence of a specified
event.149 Other methods differ by jurisdiction, but easements gener-
ally may be terminated by release, 15o abandonment,151 estoppel,15 2
prescription,15 3 merger,154 and eminent domain.155 One has to look
carefully at the state law and at the specific terms of an easement to
determine how it can be enforced, terminated, and transferred.
51 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982). The parties usually have in mind that the easement
will benefit a parcel of land. If the benefit of the easement will be useful to a
successor owner of that parcel, courts take that as an indication that the parties
intended an appurtenant easement.
147. Ross Netherton studied whether easements in gross are assignable in the United
States and found no clear consensus. In his 1979 paper, he reported that sixteen
states leaned toward nonassignability, five states sustained assignability, six re-
quired statutory authorization for easements in gross to be assignable, and nine
states had such conflicting case law that no clear rule could be divined. Ross D.
Netherton, Environmental Conservation and Historic Preservation Through Re-
corded Land-Use Agreements, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 540, 558-59, 578-79
(1979). Although the Restatement of Property rejects the notion that easements
in gross may not be assigned, it is still part of the common law in many states.
Hollingshead, supra note 2, at 327-28.
148. Examples of injunctions include requiring repair, requiring the land be returned
from status quo, or enjoining a landowner from continuing an offending activity.
149. Other examples include an agreement to terminate an easement upon the com-
pletion or removal of its purpose, or upon failure to comply with other easement
conditions. 3 RicHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 34.19 (Patrick J.
Rohan ed., 2004).
150. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 500 (1944).
151. Id. § 504.
152. Id. § 505.
153. Continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse use for a statutorily specified period. Id.
§ 506.
154. An easement is a right in someone else's land; if the land becomes the easement
holder's land, the easement ceases to operate. Essentially, if the easement holder
acquires title to the servient estate, the servient and dominant interests merge
and the easement terminates. Id. §§ 497-99.




Real covenants, a second type of servitude, are promises regarding
the land that run with the land and are enforceable at law.156 Like
easements, real covenants can be either affirmative 157 or negative. 158
A real covenant is an agreement between a landowner and one or
more other parties where the landowner promises to do (or refrain
from doing) something related to her property. This action (or inac-
tion) bestows a benefit on the other party or parties to the agreement.
If the agreement is structured appropriately, both the benefits and
burdens of a real covenant pass to successive owners of the underlying
estates. 15 9 Courts consider the burden and benefit separately to de-
termine whether they run to subsequent landowners.160
At common law, for a burden to run with the land (i) the covenant
had to be in writing; (ii) the original parties to the agreement had to
intend it to run; (iii) the burden and the benefit of the covenant both
had to touch and concern the land; and (iv) there had to be both hori-
zontal and vertical privity.1 6 1 The first two requirements are rela-
tively straightforward, although some investigation into the original
intent of the parties may be needed where it is not clear from the writ-
ten document. The requirement that the burden touch and concern
the land is a bit more ambiguous. Generally, this has meant that the
burden refer to a "physical use or restriction of the covenantor's
land."16 2 Traditionally upheld burdens include covenants to repair or
maintain land or structures on the land. Some courts recognize
broader burdens as touching and concerning land. For example, some
courts have upheld restrictions on businesses that would compete
with business activity on neighboring land. 163
Many courts hold that a burden will not run with the land if the
benefit does not touch and concern the land.164 It is not entirely clear
156. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 141, at 939.
157. Lake Arrowhead Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Looney, 770 P.2d 1046 (Wash. 1989).
158. Runyon v. Paley, 416 S.E.2d 777 (N.C. 1992).
159. This is a key distinction between a covenant under contract law and a real cove-
nant under property law. Under traditional common law, the rights and duties
associated with contracts were not assignable. Contracts terminated at the death
of one of the original parties to the agreement. With real covenants, these rights
and duties (now termed burdens and benefits) attach to the underlying property
and transfer with the property interests.
160. Judith S.H. Atherton, An Assessment of Conservation Easements: One Method of
Protecting Utah's Landscape, 6 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 55, 59 (1985).
161. CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH
LAND": INCLUDING LICENSES, EASEMENTS, PROFITS, EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS AND
RENTS, 92-143 (2d ed. 1947).
162. DWYER & MENELL, supra note 135, at 759.
163. See, e.g., Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 290 (Mass. 1979).
164. GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL COVE-
NANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES 378 (2d ed. 2004).
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why the benefit must touch and concern the covenantee's land in order
for the burden to run. Some courts have used this requirement to pre-
vent restrictions on trade.16 5 In Norcross v. James,166 the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court declined to uphold a covenant preventing a
landowner from mining his land. Although the burden tied to the
land, the benefit did not. The goal of the covenant was to prevent com-
petition from a nearby mine. The court deemed the benefit personal
and would not allow the covenant to run.16 7
Professor Gerald Korngold offers several potential reasons for
courts' disfavor of covenants in gross. First, some courts may have
been concerned about the marketability of land.168 It may be more
difficult to locate the benefit holder where a covenant is in gross
rather than appurtenant. This increased effort in locating a benefit
holder can increase transactions costs when a landowner seeks to
modify or terminate a covenant.169 It takes more time and effort to
determine the appropriate person with whom to negotiate.
Second, Korngold contends that courts may have enforced such a
rule in an effort to minimize long-term (or "dead hand") control and
limit veto power over land. 1 70 Where a covenant must be appurte-
nant-where the benefit much touch and concern the land for the bur-
den to run with the land-the number of potential benefit holders is
limited. Generally, this means that the benefit holder is someone lo-
cated nearby and is usually a member of the community. Such a limi-
tation can work to prevent one person or organization from exerting
veto power over large areas of land. This is essentially a democracy
argument. If one wealthy person can pay everyone to enter into cove-
nants that benefit him in gross, he will be able to assert his view of the
landscape and community planning. Following this logic, limiting the
categories of permissible benefit holders curbs the ability of powerful
individuals or groups to have undue control over an area. This con-
cern is similar to anti-trust concerns where courts work to limit the
power of individuals or small groups.171 The appurtenancy restriction
165. See, e.g., Norcross v. James, 2 N.E. 946 (Mass. 1885) (declaring a covenant not to
compete to be unenforceable against successors because it did not touch and con-
cern the land, rather than declaring anti-competitive business agreements void
on other public policy grounds), overruled by Whitinsville Plaza, 390 N.E.2d 290.
166. Norcross, 2 N.E.2d 946.
167. Accord Shell Oil Co. v. Henry Ouellette & Sons Co., 227 N.E.2d 509 (Mass. 1967).
168. KORNGOLD, supra note 164, at 378; see, e.g., Minch v. Saymon, 233 A.2d 385 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
169. KORNGOLD, supra note 164, at 378; see also, e.g., Minch, 233 A.2d 385.
170. KORNGOLD, supra note 164, at 378.
171. See, e.g., State v. Hossan-Maxwell, Inc., 436 A.2d 284 (Conn. 1980); Sun Oil Co. v.
Trent Auto Wash, Inc., 150 N.W.2d 818 (Mich. 1967) (expressing concern that
businesses could use covenants to create monopolies by creating agreements lim-
iting landowners' ability to visit competing gas stations).
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also works to limit outside influence.17 2 Only those individuals or or-
ganizations that own land in the community can create these restric-
tive agreements.
Third, Korngold offers that courts may have upheld such a rule
because it increases flexibility in the enforcement of covenants. When
the parties to covenants are neighbors, they may be more likely to
modify agreements in order to maintain community relations.173 Ad-
ditionally, such parties may be more likely to settle disputes infor-
mally. This may be especially true in situations with reciprocal
covenants. A landowner may be more willing to cooperate in adjusting
a covenant to meet a neighbor's needs if that landowner thinks it is
likely that the table will be turned in the future. Indeed, entering into
flexible agreements and negotiating changes over time could build so-
cial capital.
Real covenants also contain other complicated requirements, such
as horizontal and vertical privity, concepts that have long befuddled
property law students. Unfortunately, jurisdictions apply the privity
requirement differently.174 Horizontal privity refers to the relation-
ship between the original parties to the covenant (the covenantor and
the covenantee). Vertical privity describes the relationship between
one of the original parties to the covenant and his successor.
For the burden of a covenant to run, the traditional rule is the orig-
inal parties to the covenant must be in horizontal privity of estate. In
jurisdictions where courts apply a strong form of horizontal privity,
the owners must have simultaneously existing interests in the land
burdened by the agreement.175 This usually means that there is ei-
ther a landlord-tenant relationship, or there is an easement operat-
ing, and the covenant is between the owners of the dominant and
servient estates.176 Obviously, this strict requirement limits the abil-
ity to create real covenants that run with the land by limiting who can
enter into such agreements. Courts have modified the requirement to
172. KORNGOLD, supra note 164, at 378-79.
173. Id. at 379 (citing Roman v. Nadler, 14 N.W.2d 482 (Minn. 1944); Hassinger v.
Kline, 457 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1983)).
174. French, supra note 130, at 934; Hollingshead, supra note 2, at 330 n.61. The con-
cept of privity was introduced, but not defined, in Spencer's Case, (1583) 77 Eng.
Rep. 72 (Q.B.).
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.4 (2000); 20 Am. Jun. 2D Cove-
nants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 18 (2004). Indeed, in England, only land-
lord-tenant relationships satisfy horizontal privity requirements; the promise
must actually appear in a lease. The rationale for this is likely tied to England's
historically inadequate land reporting system. Judges wanted to curtail restric-
tions on land because covenants could not be discovered by visual inspection of
the land. This is essentially a notice requirement. If the agreement is in a lease,
courts infer that the parties are aware of the restrictions and bargained for the
deal. See Keppell v. Bailey, (1834) 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch.).
176. JAMES C. SMITH, NEIGHBORING PROPERTY OWNERS § 7:13 (Supp. 2004).
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some weaker forms of horizontal privity.X77 Most jurisdictions appear
to view horizontal privity as tied to the conveyance of the fee simple.
For example, privity of estate is present where the promise is con-
tained in a conveyance of the fee simple.' 7 8 Real covenants are the
only type of servitude with a horizontal privity requirement.179
Beyond the horizontal privity requirement, most jurisdictions also
require vertical privity. For the burden to run to a successor owner of
the land, that landowner must be in vertical privity of estate with the
original covenantor. Vertical privity exists where the successor ac-
quires the covenantor's land by an approved method.180 Approved
methods include devise, intestacy, grant, or judicial sale. Acquiring
land by adverse possession does not yield privity. Thus, an adverse
possessor will not be subject to the burden of a real covenant. Addi-
tionally, the successor must acquire the same type of interest that the
predecessor had (although it could be over a smaller portion of the
land or for a shorter duration).' 8 1
Determining whether the benefit of a real covenant will run with
the land is a separate analysis from determining whether the burden
runs with the land. The circumstances determining when a benefit
will run with the land at law similar, but not identical: (i) the agree-
ment must be in writing; (ii) the parties must intend for the benefit to
run with the land; and (iii) the benefit of the covenant must touch and
concern the land. The privity requirements are not as strict for the
benefit side of the analysis. Most states hold that the benefit of a cove-
nant can run without horizontal privity,l8 2 but there must be at least
177. See, e.g., Mosely v. Bishop, 470 N.E.2d 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Morse v. Aldrich,
36 Mass. 449 (1837); see also SMITH, supra note 176, § 7:13; Hollingshead, supra
note 2, at 329.
178. Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871); Runyon v. Paley, 416 S.E.2d 177 (N.C.
1992); Hollingshead, supra note 2, at 330 n.61. American courts have expanded
the privity requirement to the point where a real covenant could be created in
any transaction involving conveyance of some other interest in land. The first
expansion of the English rule occurred as early as 1837 in Massachusetts. It was
called simultaneous or instantaneous privity. French, supra note 130, at 934 &
n.23.
179. There is also a minority view holding that horizontal privity should not be re-
quired. Gallagher v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1028 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
180. DWYER & MENELL, supra note 135, at 757.
181. Id.
182. Pakenham's Case, Y.B. 42 Edw. 3, pl. 14 (1368), reprinted in 2 JOHN C. GRAY,
SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 357 (2d ed.
1906). It appears that both the privity and notice requirements were linked by a
desire to keep lands free of undiscoverable burdens. The courts were concerned
about purchasers unwittingly buying land burdened by restrictions that were not
obvious from a physical inspection of the property. Benefits are not accompanied
by this same concern and they do not affect marketability. The Restatement
(First) of Property supports the view that horizontal privity should not be re-
quired for a benefit to run. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 548 (1944).
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vertical privity between the original covenantee and the successor.' 8 3
This occurs when the person claiming the benefit is the successor to
the benefit estate.18 4 The vertical privity requirements are a bit more
relaxed for determining whether the benefit runs with the land as
compared to determining whether the burden runs. For the benefit to
run, courts often allow one to succeed to an estate of lesser
duration. 18 5
As mentioned above, real covenants are promises regarding land
enforceable at law. These last two words are important. Historically,
the judicial system consisted of two categories of courts: courts of law
and courts of equity.18 6 In courts of law, the only available remedies
were monetary.' 8 7 Courts of equity allowed for remedies like injunc-
tions and specific performance.18 8 Today, lawyers even call these "eq-
uitable remedies."' 8 9 The courts of law and equity merged long ago,
but there are still some holdover distinctions in remedies and other
places. Because real covenants are enforceable at law and not in eq-
uity, damages are the available remedy, giving rise to personal liabil-
ity only. Injunctive relief is not available when enforcing agreements
as real covenants. 190 This distinction is one of the main reasons be-
hind the birth of the equitable servitude discussed in the following
subsection.
3. Equitable Servitudes
A third category of servitudes is "equitable servitudes." The newest
form of servitudes, equitable servitudes first emerged in the middle of
the nineteenth century.191 They developed as a reaction to the rigid
requirements of real covenants.192 Like real covenants, equitable ser-
183. See 9 RIcHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON PROPERTY § 60.04 [3] [c] [v] (Michael A. Wolf
ed., 2000).
184. Id. § 60.04[3][c][iv].
185. Id.; Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp. v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 212 S.E.2d 715,
719-20 (Va. 1975) (holding that simply because a corporation is a lessee of only a
portion of an estate does not prevent the corporation from suing to enforce the
benefit of a covenant running with the estate).
186. In England (and a few states in America), law and equity courts remain separate
courts.
187. Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990).
188. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 211-14 (2002);
Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. 557, 562 (1869).
189. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 468-69
(1957).
190. 7 G.W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY:
THOMPSON ON PROPERTY § 61.05(a) (David Thomas et al. eds., Supp. 2005). By
characterizing the agreements as equitable servitudes, one may be able to obtain
injunctive relief.
191. Atherton, supra note 160, at 60.
192. See, e.g., Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige Ch. 254 (N.Y. Ch. 1832); Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848)
41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch.).
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vitudes are created by written agreement.' 9 3 Essentially, equitable
servitudes are covenants running with the land enforced in equity. 194
As is true with real covenants, both the burden and benefit of an equi-
table servitude will only run with the land if the original parties to the
agreement intended them to run. 19 5
As with real covenants, the running of the burdens and benefits
are examined separately. If a burden runs, it is not axiomatic that the
benefit runs with the land as well. The burden of an equitable servi-
tude will not run with the land unless that burden touches and con-
cerns the land. Generally, the burden will not run in cases where the
benefit does not touch and concern the land as well. This means that
in some jurisdictions, the burden will run even where the benefit is in
gross.
A key difference between equitable servitudes and real covenants
is that equitable servitudes do not have any privity requirements.196
Notice requirements are also prominent with equitable servitudes.19 7
The courts of equity developed the rule that the burden would not run
to a purchaser without actual or constructive notice.198
As stated earlier, for the benefit of an equitable servitude to run
with the land, the parties must intend that it do so. Additionally, the
benefit of an equitable servitude must touch and concern the land for
it to run with the land. However, the benefit of an equitable servitude
may run with the land even if the burden does not touch or concern
the land.199
The most obvious differences between equitable servitudes and
real covenants are the respective remedies associated with them. An
193. There is one common exception to this rule: negative equitable servitudes may be
implied by general plans developed for subdivisions. See, e.g., Turner v. Brocato,
111 A.2d 855 (Md. 1955); Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925); Buffalo
Acad. of Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., Inc., 196 N.E. 42 (N.Y. 1935); Evans v.
Pollock, 796 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1990); Mid-State Equip. Co. v. Bell, 225 S.E.2d 877
(Va. 1976); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.14 (2000).
194. Netherton, supra note 147, at 551. The Restatement of Property for servitudes
actually recommends abolishing the distinctions between equitable servitudes
and real covenants. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.4 cmt. a
(2000).
195. DWYER & MENELL, supra note 135, at 766.
196. Id.
197. Id.; Mackinder v. OSCA Dev. Co., 198 Cal. Rptr. 864, 869-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
198. The burden of a real covenant might not turn to a purchaser without notice be-
cause of recording acts. In most jurisdictions, the burden of an equitable servi-
tude will not run without notice to the purchaser where the person is a bona fide
purchaser of the burdened land. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 539 cmt. 1
(1944); POWELL, supra note 183, § 60.04[4]. Equitable servitudes continue to run
against successors who do not pay (or give any value) for the land regardless of
whether they received notice. POWELL, supra note 183, § 60.04[4].
199. This is also true with real covenants.
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equitable servitude is enforced by equitable remedies making them
more appropriate for conservation purposes.
B. Common Law Rules Left a Gap (Enforceable, Assignable
Negative Easements In Gross)
Although the common law offers many possible ways to restrict
land, these ways all present problems when pursuing long-term land
conservation. To protect land, it would be helpful to be able to make
enforceable perpetual negative servitudes in gross. Land preservation-
ists want an agreement that will run with the burdened land so con-
servation can continue beyond the current landowners. This requires
assignable tools; no traditional servitude meets all these needs.
If using an easement to protect land, one is likely to desire a nega-
tive easement. The goal is to prevent the landowner from destroying,
developing, or harming his land. As discussed earlier, the categories of
allowable negative easements differ by jurisdiction, but historically
negative easements have been limited. When courts do uphold nega-
tive easements, they are appurtenant easements. For conservation
purposes, it would be more useful to have easements in gross. That
way, conservation organizations, like land trusts, could hold the ease-
ment. Some jurisdictions do permit easements in gross, but not nega-
tive easements in gross because none of the permissible negative
easements can be held in gross. Additionally, if seeking long-term
protection of land, a conservationist would want a transferable ease-
ment. Then, the conservation benefit will remain even if the easement
holder dies (or, if an organization dissolves). In most jurisdictions,
easements in gross could not be transferred at common law.2 00 Today,
courts increasingly allow transfer of easements in gross.20 1 Uncer-
tainty about transferability combined with limitations on permissible
negative easements mean that easements do not work well to achieve
long-term land protection goals.
Because real covenants can be either affirmative or negative, they
may be a useful tool. However, there are limitations to real covenants.
Meeting the privity requirements can be difficult, depending on the
jurisdiction's version of privity. It is also difficult to have a real cove-
nant in gross that can run with the land because in many jurisdictions
the burden will not run where a benefit is in gross. Even where a via-
ble real covenant can be created to protect conservation values, viola-
tion of the covenant results only in an award of monetary damages. If
200. George Kloek, Assignability and Divisibility of Easements In Gross, 22 CHi.-KENT
L. REV. 239 (1944); Gerald E. Welsh, The Assignability of Easements In Gross, 12
U. CHI. L. REV. 276 (1945).
201. Alan David Hegi, Note, The Easement In Gross Revisited: Transferability and
Divisibility Since 1945, 39 VAND. L. REV. 109, 110-11 (1986) (noting that courts
are increasingly allowing transfer of easements in gross).
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the aim is to protect the environment and prevent ecosystem degrada-
tion, specific performance and other equitable remedies are more de-
sirable. For example, it would be better to stop habitat destruction
than to later receive money for the loss of a species, which would be of
unknown value.
Equitable servitudes may then appear to be the last resort, and
indeed, the fact that they yield equitable remedies and do not have
privity requirements makes them attractive. The limiting factor is the
likelihood of a rule preventing the running of the burden where the
benefit is in gross.2 02 Traditionally, courts have not favored agree-
ments between parties when a landowner's burden or obligation was
tied to his land, but the benefit was not. 20 3 The prohibition on holding
equitable servitudes in gross makes them an inappropriate tool for
widespread conservation. Conservation organizations and government
entities would not be able to negotiate enforceable agreements under
this rubric.
The inadequacy of these servitudes has led states to enact conser-
vation easement statutes. These state statutes do not require conser-
vation easements to be tied to neighboring land. Holders of
conservation easements may be located anywhere and may move
around without disrupting their conservation easement property
right. Thus, conservation easements under these statutes can be char-
acterized as either negative easements in gross, or negative covenants
running with the land where the burden will run even though the ben-
efit is in gross. Neither one is a character of the common law unless in
a jurisdiction where the court would permit the burden of a covenant
to run even though the benefit is in gross.
C. Fundamentals of Conservation Easements
Because of common law obstacles to conservation easements,
states have passed laws recognizing a new type of servitude called a
conservation easement.20 4 All fifty states now have conservation ease-
ments statutes,20 5 affecting over three million acres of land nation-
202. Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good, Preserving the
Environment on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373, 382-83 (2001); Jeffrey
Tapick, Note, Threats to the Continued Existence of Conservation Easements, 27
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 257, 270-71 (2002).
203. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 141, at 941.
204. See generally SALLY K. FAIRFAX & DARLA GUENZLER, CONSERVATION TRUSTS 152
(2001); King & Fairfax, supra note 2.
205. Wyoming was the last state to adopt a conservation easement statute. Act of Feb.
25, 2005, 2005 Wyo. Sess. Laws 127 (to be codified at Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-1-201 to
-207 (2005)). Prior to its adoption, Wyoming had conservation easements that
relied on common law notions of real covenants, easements, and equitable servi-
tudes. See generally Michael R. Eitel, Comment, Wyoming's Trepidation Toward
Conservation Easement Legislation: A Look at Two Issues Troubling the Wyoming
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wide. 20 6 The oldest identifiable conservation easement statutes were
adopted in 1956 in Massachusetts 2O7 and in 1959 in California.20
These early laws provided little guidance on how conservation ease-
ments should operate; therefore, few landowners took advantage of
them.209 Originally, the California and Massachusetts statutes only
authorized government entities to hold conservation easements, 210
but in 1969, Massachusetts became the first state to allow nonprofits
to hold conservation easements. 2 11 Many states with conservation
easement statutes modeled their legislation on the Uniform Conserva-
tion Easement Act ("UCEA"),212 which the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved in 1981.213
Conservation easements are property rights in land held by some-
one other than the landowner. Additionally, these rights must have a
conservation purpose. The UCEA defines a conservation easement as:
State Legislature, 4 Wyo. L. REV. 57 (2004); Tapick, supra note 202. Additionally,
Wyoming residents could still take advantage of federal tax breaks if they ad-
hered to IRS guidelines. The federal tax guidelines do not require conservation
easements to comply with state law.
206. Nancy McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement Do-
nations-A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 21 (2004). McLaughlin's
article shows the amount of land protected by conservation easements held by
land trusts. Because the acreage protected by government entities is unknown,
the total number of protected acres is much higher.
207. 1956 Mass. Acts ch. 631.
208. The Scenic Easement Deed Act of 1959, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6950-6954 (West
1959). Although these are the oldest conservation easement statutes, scholars
show conservation easements as dating back much further. The first American
conservation easement appears to have been written in the late 1880s to protect
the parks and parkways of Boston designed by Frederick Law Olmstead. See Ju-
lie Ann Gustanski, Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements, Voluntary Ac-
tions, and Private Lands, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 9 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds.,
2000) [hereinafter PROTECTING THE LAND]; Jean Hocker, Foreword to PROTECTING
THE LAND, supra, at xvii. These older conservation easements were born without
statute, and therefore the courts could have overturned them based on the com-
mon law impediments discussed in the previous section. Additionally, although
there is a rich history of conservation easements, they were still considered an
obscure tool until recently. Indeed, the first publication using the term "conser-
vation easement" was not written until 1959. Id.; see also Whyte, supra note 1.
Even today, scholars, practitioners, and landowners tend to think of conservation
easements as a "new" tool. See Hollingshead, supra note 2 (describing the history
of conservation easements).
209. Morrisette, supra note 202, at 385.
210. Cheever, supra note 2, at 1080.
211. Morrisette, supra note 202, at 385.
212. Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Unif. Law Comm'rs, A Few
Facts About the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, www.nccusl.orglupdate/
uniformactjfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucea.asp (last visited May 15, 2006).
213. For the text of the UCEA, see http-J/www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1980s/
ucea8l.pdf (last visited May 15, 2006).
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A nonpossessory interest of a holder in a real property imposing limitations or
affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retaining or protecting
natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring its availability
for agriculture, forest, recreational or open-space use, protecting natural re-
sources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality or preserving the his-
torical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.
2 1 4
When an owner places a conservation easement on his land,
whether by donating it, selling it, or creating it to meet legal require-
ments, he is generally agreeing to refrain from exercising certain
rights.2 15 These can include the right to develop, the right to farm in a
certain manner, and the right to fill in wetlands. In the traditional
property-as-a-bundle-of-sticks metaphor, a conservation easement
takes a stick from the bundle and sells or gives it to someone else.
State statutes determine who may accept the stick and set rules about
the method of transfer. It is not a straightforward transfer of a right,
however, because the holder of a conservation easement cannot exer-
cise the right it holds. For example, if a landowner donates a conserva-
tion easement in the form of the right to develop his property, the
holder of the conservation easement does not gain the development
right. Conservation easements, therefore, are really rights of enforce-
ment. The holder of the conservation easement has the right to bring
an action against the landowner if the terms of the conservation ease-
ment are violated. Generally, the conservation easement holder is ei-
ther a government entity or a nonprofit conservation organization.
Because statutes and regulations about conservation easements vary
by state, there may be differences in the duration and requirements
regarding conservation easements, including limitations on who is al-
lowed to hold the right.
Conservation easements are different from traditional easements.
The term "conservation easement" is so new it is not even in law dic-
tionaries. 216 The legal concept of a conservation easement is a statu-
tory construction that contradicts principles of common law despite
214. UCEA § 1(1) (1981).
215. Although we generally think of conservation easements as negative restrictions
preventing landowners from doing certain actions, conservation easements may
also have affirmative obligations such as requiring restoration projects. Alexan-
der R. Arpad, Comment, Private Transactions, Public Benefits, and Perpetual
Control over the Use of Real Property: Interpreting Conservation Easements as
Charitable Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 91, 112-21 (2002) (explaining
that the affirmative aspect of conservation easements is often ignored). States
often explicitly recognize both negative restrictions and affirmative duties in
their state conservation easement statutes. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-
21(1) (2004); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.800 (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 271.715(1) (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-8-20(1) (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 700.40(1)(a) (West 2004).
216. This does not mean however that the concept is new. There have been many
forms of easements and other servitudes in land, but bringing these ideas to-
gether under one workable concept is new.
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being linked to the traditional notions of easements and other
servitudes.
The following subsections describe the basic elements of conserva-
tion easements and explains the various components and require-
ments. Because state laws regarding conservation easements vary,
these subsections merely present a general picture. Practitioners
should always examine the particular statutes and common law in the
state in which they are working.
1. Four Methods for Creating Conservation Easements:
Donation, Sale, Eminent Domain, and Exaction
Many landowners donate conservation easements burdening their
land. They may do so for many reasons, including the desire to pre-
serve the character of land and to receive a tax break as described
below. Conservation easements, like other property rights, can also be
sold. Because there is no clearinghouse for conservation easements,
the percentage of conservation easements sold is unknown. The chief
motivation for selling conservation easements is likely to be the
money made from the sale, but landowners who sell conservation
easements may also be motivated by the desire to retain the character
of their land and their way of life, or to gain some property tax
benefits. 217
Landowners voluntarily engage in the donation and sale of conser-
vation easements. With conservation easements obtained through reg-
ulatory methods (taken and exacted conservation easements),
however, government agencies play more significant roles. In some
states, conservation easements may be "taken" using the power of em-
inent domain.2 1 8 Numerous federal and state laws allow government
entities to condemn conservation easements. 2 19 In such cases, the gov-
ernment agency taking the conservation easement pays the underly-
ing landowner just compensation for the loss of the property right.
Both federal and state governments have acknowledged that acquisi-
tion of conservation easements via eminent domain may be a neces-
217. PAUL ELCONIN & VALERIE A. LuzADis, EVALUATION OF LANDOWNER SATISFACTION
WITH CONSERVATION RESTRICTIONS 9-11 (1997).
218. For some introductory discussions of using eminent domain to create conserva-
tion easements, see Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Authority for Federal Acquisition of
Conservation Easements to Provide Agricultural Credit Relief, 35 DRAKE L. REV.
477, 506 (1986); Michael Paul Stevens, Historic Preservations: Prohibit Power of
Eminent Domain from Creating, Altering, or Affecting Conservation Easements,
10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 207 (1993); John Casey Mills, Note, Conservation Ease-
ments in Oregon: Abuses and Solutions, 14 ENVTL. L. 555, 560 (1984).
219. See, e.g., JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND Li-
CENSES IN LAND § 12:2 (2004); see also Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16
U.S.C. § 1277 (2005).
[Vol. 84:10431088
EXACTED CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
sary component of land conservation programs. 220 However, a few
states have specifically prohibited states and municipalities from us-
ing their eminent domain power to acquire conservation
easements. 2 2 1
Increasingly, instead of being a private decision about the future of
one family's farm, conservation easements are part of large develop-
ment projects with complex permitting programs, giving rise to a
fourth category of conservation easements: those exacted through a
regulatory process. When developers and individual landowners want
to make changes to the land, there are often local, state, and federal
permit requirements. 22 2 Many of these permit programs require the
permittees of larger projects to incorporate some type of conservation
for mitigation. 223 Conservation easements are one of the most com-
mon methods of meeting these mitigation requirements. 2 2 4 These con-
servation easements are of a different sort than those donated or sold.
Developers may be required to place some type of conservation ease-
ment on their own land or to purchase a conservation easement on
someone else's land. Although they engage in the transactions will-
ingly, the conservation easements should not be viewed in the same
light as donated and sold conservation easements. Both the incentives
and benefits of these types of conservation easements are very differ-
ent from those associated with donated and sold conservation
easements.
2. Benefits of Conservation Easements
Conservation easements emerged, not just because the time was
ripe, but also because there are many benefits associated with the
tool. Importantly, federal and state governments have been increas-
ingly cognizant of the public benefits associated with conservation
easements and have enabled tax breaks for conservation easement do-
nors. This subsection discusses the benefits of conservation ease-
ments. These numerous benefits explain why conservation easements
220. See, e.g., Racine v. United States, 858 F.2d 506, 507 (9th Cir. 1988); Bennett v.
Comm'r of Food & Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1991); see also Kamrowski v.
State, 142 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Wis. 1966) (sustaining the eminent domain power to
acquire scenic easements along the St. Croix River in Wisconsin).
221. See, e.g., AiAsKA STAT. § 34.17.010(e) (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 271.725(1) (2003);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-7(1) (2005); ALA. CODE § 35-18-2(a) (2004). But see ALA.
CODE § 35-18-2(e).
222. RIcHARD J. LAZARUs, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 194-96 (2004).
223. See, e.g., General Policies for Evaluating Permit Applications, Clean Water Act
§ 404 Permit Regulations, 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r); Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2004).
224. Interview with Clark Morrison, Partner, Morrison & Foerster, in Berkeley, Cal.
(Oct. 8, 2003); Telephone Interview with David Nawi, Counsel, Shute, Mihaly &
Weinberger, in Berkeley, Cal. (Nov. 17, 2003).
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have proliferated. These benefits also echo sentiments of property
rights advocates explained earlier in this Article honoring private lo-
cally-made decisions over federal government regulation. This Article
focuses on the benefits of conservation easements because those bene-
fits are what enable the tool to prosper. The picture is not completely
rosy however; there are also many concerns associated with conserva-
tion easements, especially relating to their long-term viability and
true public value. Those concerns are not discussed here, but explora-
tions of such concerns are available elsewhere. 22 5
a. Benefits to Conservation Easement Donors and Sellers
The benefits of conservation easements vary based on how the con-
servation easements were created. Because Part IV considers exacted
conservation easements, here, I examine the benefits when a land-
owner either donates or sells a conservation easement. Although there
is a slight difference in tax advantages, many of the same benefits are
present for both donors and sellers.
i. Conservation Goals
There are many different personal incentives for creating conser-
vation easements. Often private landowners create conservation ease-
ments to protect personal values. Property owners who do not want to
see their land turned into a strip mall or who want to make sure that
the family farm remains a farm look to conservation easements to pro-
tect their interests in the land. Some landowners may have pure con-
servation motives-a wish to protect a certain species or habitat, for
example. Many people who donate conservation easements cite the
ability to leave a lasting mark on the land as the strongest incen-
tive. 226 This type of altruistic incentive may also be influential for peo-
ple who sell conservation easements on their land. Land conservation
may be a primary goal, 2 2 7 but may not be possible for some landown-
ers unless they can sell a conservation easement.
ii. Tax Breaks
One of the chief benefits of donating or selling a conservation ease-
ment is the potential of significant tax benefits. Federal law provides
tax breaks to landowners who donate conservation easements based
on the value of the conservation easement as a charitable donation.2 28
225. See, e.g., Jessica Owley Lippmann, Exacted Conservation Easements (Dec. 19,
2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, on file with the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW).
226. Lynn Asinof, Conservation Easements Lighten Taxes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1999,
at C1.
227. ELCONIN & LuzADIs, supra note 217, at 9-10.
228. I.R.C. § 170 (2000). To calculate the value of the donation, take the value of the
land before the conservation easement and compare it to the value of the land
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There are also estate tax benefits because the fair market value of the
land is reduced, and the federal tax code now allows a reduction of
estate taxes for certain qualified easements.2 29 State tax benefits
vary, but there are often reductions in property tax. The tax benefits
encourage landowners to set aside their land and serve as a counter-
weight to development pressures. For landowners to reap all the pos-
sible advantages of conservation easements, they must conform to
both state and federal rules.2 30
In 1964, changes to the Internal Revenue Code formally defined
conservation easements at the federal level and allowed income tax
deductions for conservation easements donated to charitable organiza-
tions.23 1 The Internal Revenue Service allows a federal income tax de-
duction for qualified charitable contributions up to a maximum of
thirty percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 23 2 However,
the value of the conservation easement donation can be spread over
five years.2 33 There are currently proposals in Congress to abolish this
tax based on some recently recorded abuses. 2 34 If Congress abolishes
the charitable contribution deduction, there will likely be fewer dona-
tions of conservation easements.
Conservation easements may also reduce the fair market value of
the underlying land. This may reduce land valuation for purposes of
local property taxes. State conservation easement statutes are often
very specific on this issue. Some statutes provide that the land will be
taxed at the lessened value of the encumbered land23 5 while others do
not allow a property tax deduction. 23 6
when encumbered by the conservation easement. The difference is the value of
the donation. For more about the valuation process and its potential problems,
see McLaughlin, supra note 206 (explaining the difficulty in determining the ap-
propriate value of the donation and the incentives for landowners to
overestimate).
229. American Farm & Ranch Protection Act, I.R.C. § 2031(c) (2000). For a discussion
of this provision and which conservation easements qualify for the deduction, see
Stephen J. Small, An Obscure Tax Code Provisions Takes Private Land Protection
into the Twenty-First Century, in PROTECTING THE LAND, supra note 208, at 55,
60-65.
230. Cheever, supra note 2, at 1084.
231. Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (1964); see also FAiRFAx & GUENZLER, supra note
204, at 152.
232. I.R.C. § 170 (2000). The amount of a contribution exceeding thirty percent of the
adjusted gross income in a given year can be carried over and deducted for the
next five years.
233. Asinof, supra note 226; McLaughlin, supra note 206 (explaining various ease-
ment related tax incentives in detail).
234. Jay Cassell, Protecting a Tax Break: Playing Wildlife Politics, TIME, Oct. 3, 2005.
235. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. § 27-8-70 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8B-7 (West
2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-208(1) (2003).
236. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-2109 (2004).
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One of the most attractive tax breaks associated with conservation
easements are those relating to estate taxes. High estate taxes make
conservation easements attractive to landowners when they begin to
make plans for passing on their land. Stephen Small, a Boston attor-
ney specializing in conservation easements, identifies estate taxes as
the driving force behind the rise in conservation easements.237 With
the current level of estate taxes and the continuing increase in prop-
erty values, many families find themselves selling their property to
cover estate taxes. 238 Conservation easements reduce the value of the
land and therefore the corresponding estate tax. Furthermore, recent
changes to the tax law allow additional estate tax deductions for land-
owners who place easements on property near metropolitan areas, na-
tional parks, wilderness areas, and urban national forests. 239
b. Benefits to Conservation Easement Holders
Conservation easements offer benefits to conservation easement
holders. Conservation easement holders generally fall into two catego-
ries: governmental entities and nonprofit organizations known as land
trusts. Conservation easements represent a benefit when compared to
alternative land protection measures. The alternatives to conservation
easements are to regulate the land, purchase the land in fee simple, or
refrain from conserving land. Private organizations do not have the
ability to regulate, so their choices come down to buying land outright,
buying (or receiving as a gift) a conservation easement, or pursuing
alternative conservation strategies that may be less effective. Because
the budgets for these organizations may be constrained, and few land-
owners donate their land, fee acquisition strategies may not be appro-
priate. And, of course, choosing not to conserve land or working
through other methods like lobbying and public pressure may not
yield the same results.
Government agencies have an additional tool in their repertoire be-
cause they can regulate landowners. At times, government regulation
may be unpalatable to communities and lead to strong reactions from
the polity. Additionally, crafting and passing legislation and accompa-
nying regulations may be a cumbersome and time consuming process,
operating at a time scale too slow to conserve needed lands and un-
likely to garner the necessary political support. This subsection exam-
ines the benefits arising from these basic conservation choices
showing why people interested in conserving land favor conservation
easements.
237. Asinof, supra note 226.
238. Id.
239. I.R.C. § 2031(c) (2000); Asinof, supra note 226.
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Conservation organizations value conservation easements as a
land protection tool because they represent a less expensive way to
protect a larger acreage. One need only purchase the rights required
to protect the environmental benefits, and not the entire fee simple
title to the land. Because conservation easements are often less costly,
they may shield more total land area from development than fee sim-
ple purchases. Additionally, landowners may be more willing to do-
nate a conservation easement and put a restriction on their land than
to donate outright fee title to their land.
c. Benefits to Government
Conservation easements provide two benefits to government agen-
cies. When the government agency is the holder of the conservation
easement, they reap the benefits of increased land protection at a
lower cost. Governments can also benefit when private organizations
hold the easements.
Conservation easements are an attractive tool because, in their
present form, they add relatively few new administrative burdens for
government agencies. The recordation requirements call upon already
existing agencies and government practices, and with a few excep-
tions, state agencies do not monitor or enforce the conservation ease-
ments. This is especially true when conservation easements are held
by private organizations. When private land conservation organiza-
tions conserve land, the government benefits because the private or-
ganization takes on tasks normally delegated to government entities.
This enables meeting societal goals through private means. This may
be accompanied by many benefits, but of particular interest to govern-
ment entities is the fact that they do not have to use their own re-
sources and people power. Essentially, the federal government can
pass its conservation duty on to nongovernmental organizations who
then monitor and enforce federally mandated agreements.
When the government owns land, it must manage that land. If con-
served land stays in the hands of private owners, those owners can
take on the major maintenance duties. Additionally, if a land trust
holds the easement, that organization takes on the duties of monitor-
ing and enforcing the conservation easement. This means that govern-
ment officials do not need to maintain and manage these lands.
Additionally, because private-sector citizens are not constrained by
the capacity of government agencies, there is no limit on the amount
of land that can be conserved with conservation easements.
There are also tax revenue benefits-when land is publicly owned,
no one pays taxes on the land. By keeping the possessory property
rights privately owned, the land stays on the tax rolls. Even if the
taxes are reduced based on a reduced value of the land, local govern-
ments still benefit from the taxes they do receive. And, as mentioned
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above, some states do not even allow a reduced tax rate for encum-
bered lands.240
d. Benefits of Conservation Easements to the Public
Even though not usually directly engaged in conservation ease-
ment transactions or formulations, the public at large benefits from
the existence of conservation easements when they work to conserve
environmental amenities. Everyone gains the benefit of increased en-
vironmental amenities and healthy functioning ecosystem services.
Additionally, many landowners can have access to this tool. Its mere
existence may be comforting to people, giving them an option for their
land.
As explained above, using conservation easements to meet environ-
mental goals keeps land on the tax rolls. We all benefit by greater
revenues. Because state and local governments use taxes to meet the
needs of the public, everyone benefits from property taxes. Because
schools are often dependent on property taxes, for example, it helps
provide quality education to local communities. If the land were in-
stead held in fee simple by either a tax-exempt nonprofit or a govern-
ment agency, there would be no such revenue.
V. EMERGENCE OF EXACTED CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
Now that we have seen how conservation easements emerged, the
next step is to understand the origin of exacted conservation ease-
ments. Exacted conservation easements are coercive tools very differ-
ent from the charitable donations discussed above. The story related
above focuses on ideals like minimal government involvement and vol-
untary agreements aimed at conserving land. Although surprising,
this background led to a tool used by all levels of government to regu-
late land.
This Part explains how exactions work generally and describes
changes to environmental laws that led to the growth of exactions of
conservation easements. Generally, conservation easements were
such a successful, popular tool that their use spread to areas not origi-
nally contemplated by drafters of conservation easements statutes.
These exacted conservation easements emerged from background
principles that they do not actually end up embodying. This diver-
gence may have significant impacts on monitoring and enforcement.
Additionally, eagerness to use conservation easements because they
seem such a market and politically friendly tool may lead to the use of
conservation easements in inappropriate circumstances.




Government agencies often condition permit issuance on exactions.
An exaction occurs when a unit of government requires a property
owner to contribute money or dedicate land to a municipality as a con-
dition of the municipality granting the owner a permit to develop
land.241 Exactions enable local governments to transfer the costs asso-
ciated with new development to developers and to future residents of
projects. 24 2 Exactions for streets, sidewalks, and utilities within a
subdivision are common examples.
The United States Supreme Court has validated the use of exac-
tions as an implementation of a zoning authority's police power as
long as the condition substantially furthers governmental purposes
that would justify denial of a building permit.243 In the 1994 Dolan v.
City of Tigard2 44 case, the Court further specified that the relation-
ship between permit conditions and anticipated impacts of develop-
ment must reflect a measure of intensity that is "roughly
proportional." 245 Thus, as long as exactions are roughly proportional
to the impact of the development, and there is a nexus between the
exactions and the proposed project's impacts, exactions are valid exer-
cises of police power.
B. Rise of Exacted Conservation Easements
Once the validity of conservation easements was solidified by state
conservation easement statutes, governments at all levels began to ex-
act conservation easements in conjunction with permitting programs.
Some federal government agencies had already been using conserva-
tion easements in conjunction with federal programs and were famil-
iar with the tool. It was an easy extension for these agencies to begin
requiring conservation easements. Importantly, exactions of conserva-
tion easements represented a land preservation alternative cheaper
than using eminent domain that could be narrowly tailored to specific
properties. However, one of the most influential reasons for expansion
of conservation easements is tied to increased environmental and
241. Elaine Spencer, A Developer's Perspective on Government Exactions in the Wake
of English Church v. Los Angeles and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
C356 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 449, 453 (1988).
242. Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions: From
Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 69 (1987); John P.
O'Connor, Jr., Note, Extortion Loses a Synonym Thanks to Court Ordered Ac-
countability in Land Use Exactions Programs: Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), 57 U. CiN. L. REv. 397 (1988).
243. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 438 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
244. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
245. Id. at 396 (articulating the "rough proportionality" test); see Jonathan M. David-
son, Ronald Rosenberg, & Michael C. Spata, "Where's Dolan?": Exactions Law in
1998, 30 URB. LAw. 683 (1998).
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land-use regulation requiring mitigation for environmental harms.
Governments exact conservation easements to meet these mitigation
requirements. These factors all combined to lead to the rise of exacted
conservation easements.
1. Tradition of Government Use of Conservation Easements
Easily Expanded to Include Exactions
There is a history of government agencies using conservation ease-
ments to protect land. The State of Massachusetts authorized acquisi-
tion of rights in land as early as 1893. Since then many states,
municipalities, and government agencies have used conservation ease-
ments as tools to protect open space, conservation, and scenic val-
ues.24 6 Notably, the federal government has been acquiring interests
in land since the 1930s. There is a strong tradition of governmental
use of conservation easements. After becoming familiar with the tools,
it was a small step to begin using conservation easements in conjunc-
tion with permitting requirements.
The federal government has been using partial interests in land to
protect federal conservation interests since 1928 when Congress
passed the Federal Rights in Land Act.247 This statute gave the Na-
tional Capital Park and Planning Commission the authority to ac-
quire "permanent rights in land adjoining park property sufficient to
prevent the use of the land in certain specified ways which would es-
sentially impair the value of the park property for its purposes." 248
Federal acquisition of conservation easements burgeoned in the
1930s with both the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and the Na-
tional Park Service ("NPS") acquiring conservation easements. As at
least one commentator has noted, the NPS has been "something of a
pioneer in the use of easements."2 49 In the 1930s, the NPS began ac-
quiring easements along scenic highways. 250 It had 2,500 acres of
246. FiRFAx & GUENZLER, supra note 204, at 42, 156.
247. Federal Rights in Land Act of 1928, 40 U.S.C.A. § 8732 (2005) (formerly cited as
40 U.S.C. § 72A).
248. 40 U.S.C.A. § 8732(a)(2) (2005).
249. RUSSELL L. BREEMAN, SHOULD "EASEMENTS" BE USED TO PROTECT NATIONAL
HISTORIC LANDMARKS?: A STUDY FOR THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 38 (1975).
250. Whyte, supra note 1, at 12. The NPS held over 177 easements along the Blue
Ridge Parkway in the 1950s. Id. Because these conservation easements were
often over land to which the government held adjoining fee title, these were not
necessarily easements in gross. Additionally, one could characterize the burden
and the benefit as running with the land. As such, these agreements may have
been permissible under traditional servitude law regarding easements and cove-
nants. However, some courts may have found it significant that the NPS held the
easements in its regulatory capacity-which may be different from holding the
benefit as a landowner. I do not address this question here; I use this example
merely to illustrate the federal government's use of nonpossessory partial inter-
ests in land aimed at protecting scenic and conservation values.
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scenic easements along the Blue Ridge Parkway and 5,000 acres along
the Natchez Trace.25 1 These easements generally involved restrictions
on building new structures, prohibitions against dumping, and regula-
tions about landscaping and erecting billboards.252
Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,253 the FWS purchased con-
servation easements over wetland and prairie potholes throughout the
Midwest. The FWS has over 500,000 acres of easements protecting
wildfowl habitat throughout the Midwest. Courts have upheld the va-
lidity of these easements including specifically their perpetual na-
ture.254 Although those were purchased and not exacted, they still set
the stage for government agencies using conservation easements as a
regulatory tool. Other federal agencies also hold and manage partial
interests in land in the form of flowage, safety, navigation, and clear-
ance easements. 2 55
State and local governments have also been acquiring and using
conservation easements for a long time. The Boston Metropolitan
Park Commission began acquiring easements for park purposes in
1893.256 States also acquire scenic and conservation easements. Wis-
consin has used the tool extensively to protect the Great River Road
along the Mississippi. Many regional authorities and municipalities
use conservation easements. For example, the Northern Virginia Re-
gional Park Authority protected the Potomac shore with conservation
easements. 2 57
This long tradition of protecting public values through partial in-
terests in land shows the extensive experience of governments at vari-
ous levels. This experience, especially where the conservation
easement programs were successful, may have contributed to the ea-
ger adoption of conservation easements and deed restrictions as a
method of mitigating for environmental harms associated with devel-
opment projects.
2. Exacting Conservation Easements as an Alternative to
Exercising Eminent Domain.
When it comes to protecting land for conservation values, govern-
ments can take two main routes. First, governments can use their in-
herent police power to regulate the land to protect the health, safety,
and welfare of the government's citizens. This is most often done
251. BRENNEMAN, supra note 249, at 10.
252. Id. at 35.
253. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 701-718k (2005).
254. See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983); United States v.
Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974).
255. BRENNEMAN, supra note 249, at 40.
256. Id. at 10.
257. Id. at 40.
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through the zoning power, which is a realm of traditional state regula-
tion.25 8 Zoning and land-use regulations emerge from state and local
governments. Regulations of these types control land use on a broad
scale often resulting in a comprehensive planning agenda and
processes. The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitu-
tional validity of zoning and land-use planning.259 Federal environ-
mental laws can also place restrictions on activities.2 60 The federal
government has the power to make environmental laws based on its
constitutional powers over commerce and treaty making.26 1 Land-use
restrictions and environmental regulations are often politically un-
palatable. As discussed earlier, American notions of property rights
are very protective of an individual's right to act on his own land. This
attitude has led to a reluctance to pass comprehensive environmental
and land-use regulations.
Federal, state, and local governments also have another land con-
servation tool at their disposal-the power of eminent domain. When
exercising the power of eminent domain, governments pay landowners
just compensation for the land they acquire. The land must be ac-
quired for a valid public purpose. Government entities can use this
broad reaching tool to obtain land crucial to conservation and open
space goals. However, this approach may be expensive depending on
the value and extent of lands desired. Additionally, eminent domain
may be a cumbersome process resulting in litigation and creating re-
sentment. For political and financial reasons, governments may wish
to restrain their use of this tool.
Conservation easements can represent a more palatable alterna-
tive to these two options. Costonis and early commentators noted that
purchase and acceptance of conservation easements could avoid the
takings claims brought about by land-use regulations. 26 2 Whyte be-
258. Viii. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
259. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
260. The distinction here is a tricky (but perhaps meaningless) one. Land-use regula-
tion is a realm of state power, but the federal government can pass environmental
regulations. The line between land-use regulation and environmental regulation
is a hazy one that would be difficult to draw. The Court tackled this question in
California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. 572 (1987), but it is
long from settled which regulations fall into which camp. The debate is not im-
portant for the purposes of this Article. The point is merely that multiple levels
of government can create valid laws that restrict activities of landowners. If the
courts decide that the federal government's regulations have moved from a fed-
eral to state realm, they may invalidate environmental statutes. If that were to
happen, the enforceability of the conservation easements negotiated under those
laws may be called into question.
261. Other constitutional hooks may also enable federal environmental regulations.
For example, the Property Clause of the United States Constitution paves the
way for regulation of federal lands including, at times, activities that take place
beyond the borders of federal lands.
262. COSTONIS Er AL., supra note 41.
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lieved that conservation easements should be an extension of the emi-
nent domain power.263 He argued that governments should use their
eminent domain power to acquire conservation easements instead of
full fee title because it would be cheaper. Whether the government is
purchasing conservation easements, accepting them from donors, or
merely allowing private organizations to use the tool to protect land,
conservation easements represent a more politically friendly tool for
achieving land conservation.
In this context, we can see how exacted conservation easements
can easily slide into the game. Instead of taking land by eminent do-
main, governments can require permit applicants to create conserva-
tion easements. This is cheaper for the federal government than later
buying the land. Additionally, applicants may prefer creating and
purchasing conservation easements to dedicating fee simple title to
the land.
3. Direct Outgrowth of State Conservation Easement Statutes
The creation of state conservation easement statutes hastened the
advent of the exacted conservation easement. These statutes had a lot
of narrative power. First, they cleared up uncertainties with the tool.
They established the assignability and validity of conservation ease-
ments. They swept away common law impediments that prevented re-
strictions from being assignable. They allowed the agreements to run
with the land regardless of the beneficiaries' status. Conservation
easement statutes allowed government agencies and land trusts to
conserve land is an old way with new assurances. Now that the as-
signability of conservation easements was assured, their use has pro-
liferated. Importantly, these state statutes also clarified a stick in the
property rights bundle. The standard incidents of ownership now in-
clude the right to develop your land. Creating specified sticks restrict-
ing certain land uses changes the way we think about land.264 The
conservation easement tool became very popular. It was seen as a way
to protect land that was not overly intrusive and drew upon market
forces. Because of its popularity, governments grew more comfortable
with its use and people began to use it to meet land conservation
needs in many contexts.
4. Mitigation Mandates
Since the 1970s, environmental laws have influenced land-use de-
cisions. Two important structures emerged out of the 1970s frame-
263. Whyte, supra note 1.
264. Property rights advocates who generally praise tools related to private contracts
and freedom to let owners make decisions about their land dislike conservation
easements because such easements further fracture property rights in their eyes.
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work of increased environmental regulation: (i) a surge in permitting
programs; and (ii) requirements for comprehensive environmental re-
view. Although governments have long required permits for activities
impacting land use, environmental laws have created more complex
permitting structures. Permitting programs operate on the local,
state, and federal levels. When developers want to begin a new pro-
ject, they will likely find themselves applying for multiple permits
from multiple government agencies at multiple levels of government-
local planning regulations need to be in tune with state environmental
permitting programs that best not run askance of federal law.
Permitting programs require close examination of environmental
impacts of proposed projects. Generally, one must also show how det-
rimental environmental impacts will be minimized and mitigated. The
mitigation requirements are one of the key assets of these laws and
often represent the real teeth of the permit and review requirements.
With the new need for mitigation, multiple mitigation structures have
developed and permit applicants and processors have come up with
new flexible mitigation tools including ones that do not appear to be
related to mitigation on their face.2 65
This rise in permitting programs and increased flexibility of miti-
gation tools within the programs represents an acknowledgement that
environmental protection must operate in the context of a developing
world where landscape and local needs change frequently. This is a
way to approach environmental problems in a world with other
desires and pressures. This concept is permeating its way through en-
vironmental laws as policymakers seek ways to make environmental
regulation more flexible. This drive for flexibility has assisted the rise
of less traditional mitigation programs like land preservation
programs.
There are two main ways to mitigate environmental harms: crea-
tion and enhancement. Creation involves constructing replacements
for destroyed amenities. For example, if a development project fills in
a wetland, a permit applicant could mitigate that harm by creating a
new wetland. Creation as mitigation has problems, however. At its
base is the notion that environmental amenities are fungible: a wet-
land is a wetland is a wetland. This is not necessarily true from an
ecological standpoint. 26 6 It is not always easy to duplicate Mother Na-
ture, and not all wetland creation projects have been successful. Of
course, as the use of creation for mitigation progresses, restoration
ecologists may learn how to make improvements on their past mis-
takes. To compensate for potential problems with creating wetlands,
265. See David C. Levy & Jessica Owley Lippmann, Preservation as Mitigation Under
CEQA: Ho-Hum or Uh-Oh?, 14 ENvTL. L. NEWS 18 (2005).
266. A wetland in a new spot is not the same as an old wetland fifty feet away if no one
tells the newts how to get to their new breeding ground.
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permit applicants may get more credit for wetlands that are near the
converted wetlands. They may also have to replace more acres of wet-
lands than they destroy. Permit applicants work closely with permit-
ting agencies to determine what level and style of creation will meet
the needs of the project.
Beyond creating new environmental amenities, project proponents
may also enhance existing amenities to mitigate for harm their
projects will cause. Although this can be as difficult ecologically as cre-
ating new amenities, this approach acknowledges that current land
uses and habitats can be increased. Enhancement is a useful tool
where marginal or threatened lands of a similar category are nearby.
For example, if there is marginal coastal sage scrub habitat available,
a developer could propose to rejuvenate and protect that habitat in
return for converting coastal sage scrub elsewhere. The enhanced sage
scrub would be able to provide greater environmental amenities than
the marginal habitat that was there before.
Creation and enhancement are the only two meaningful mitigation
techniques available. However, many environmental laws define miti-
gation more broadly to include avoidance, minimization, and preser-
vation.2 6 7 Although these three techniques are worthwhile and should
be pursued under any conservation program or development project,
they are not proper "mitigation." Avoidance of harm and minimization
of impacts should be steps taken prior to engaging in a harmful activ-
ity. Mitigation projects should compensate for the harm remaining af-
ter avoidance and minimization strategies have been used to their
utmost.
Although preservation should not qualify as mitigating environ-
mental harm, it is one of the most popular mitigation techniques. It is
used to meet mitigation requirements under numerous laws and in
many contexts. Preservation involves setting aside existing environ-
mental amenities and ensuring that they are not harmed or destroyed.
Therefore, preservation means essentially sacrificing some environ-
267. This usually happens at the regulation or implementation stage instead of in the
statute. For example, the ESA requires HCPs to 'minimize and mitigate" im-
pacts. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2004). This would seem to indicate that min-
imization is something different from mitigation. The regulations also appear to
differentiate between avoidance and mitigation. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 216.5
(2005). Indeed, many environmental laws appear to intend that the impacts of
projects first be minimized. The agencies promulgating the regulations then con-
flate the concepts and include avoidance, minimization, and preservation under
the umbrella of mitigation. In the case of the ESA, this conflation occurs in the
HCP Handbook. Such a definition is especially alarming in the ESA context. The
ESA prohibits habitat destruction or adverse modification. Therefore, no habitat
should be converted. To allow habitat destruction in exchange for protecting
other habitat areas, leads to overall habitat destruction-a net loss of habitat.
Essentially one landowner gets "credit" for protecting other land that is already
restricted by the ESA.
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mental amenities for assured protection of other areas. Preservation
techniques often draw upon conservation easements. Specifically, per-
mitting agencies often require preservation via conservation ease-
ments in exchange for permission to impact land. This is the essential
example of an exacted conservation easement.
C. Exacted Conservation Easements and State Conservation
Easement Statutes
The drafters of the UCEA and state conservation easement stat-
utes did not appear to contemplate exacted conservation easements.
Very few statutes mention exactions out right, and those that do dis-
cuss them unfavorably. 268 The legislative history of the UCEA shows
no discussion of exactions. Indeed, most conservation easements ap-
pear to be designed around donated conservation easements with ap-
plications to sold easements sometimes included. This lack of
consideration means that the legislators did not consider or plan for
the easements to be used as they are being used.
There is a "dog did not bark" argument here. Because no one talked
about exactions, we assume that they did not plan for these to be exac-
tions. The lack of legislative history in this situation is telling. It is a
big enough diversion from a donation that we would expect there to be
a legislative history on this issue. Some states must have directly con-
templated using conservation easements as exactions, because they
directly or indirectly mention exactions in their state conservation
easement legislation. Arizona, for example, specifically prohibits trad-
ing conservation easements for any type of entitlement.269 Thus, Ari-
zona specifically prohibits the use of conservation easements as
exactions.
California specifically prohibits exactions by local governments
and declares that conservation easements must be "voluntary."27 0
This begs the question-what would make a conservation easement
involuntary? The only two clear options appear to be taking of conser-
vation easements by eminent domain and potentially exactions.
Whether exactions are voluntary is unsettled, but the Supreme Court
seemed to say that they are not.2 7 1
268. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 33-272(A) (LexisNexis 2004) ("[Clonservation easements shall
be voluntarily created and shall not be required by a political subdivision or gov-
ernment entity."); CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.3(b) (West 2004) ("No local governmental
entity may condition the issuance of an entitlement for use on the applicant's
granting of a conservation easement pursuant to this chapter.").
269. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 33-272(A).
270. CAL. Crv. CODE § 815.3(b).
271. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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D. Comparison to Conservation Easements
Although largely similar to other conservation easements, exacted
conservation easements differ in three key ways. First, the motivation
behind exacted conservation easements is different from the motiva-
tion giving rise to traditional conservation easements. Second, exacted
conservation easements are always part of a larger regulatory struc-
ture. Third, exacted conservation easements may not adhere to state
conservation easement statutes. This section describes and explains
the effects of each of these three differences.
1. Factors Motivating Creation of Exacted Conservation
Easements and Traditional Conservation Easements
Differ
The main difference between conservation easements and exacted
conservation easements is the motivation behind the agreements.
Traditional conservation easements stem from voluntary agreements
while exacted conservation easements are coerced. Although I con-
sider exacted conservation easements coerced, it is not clear whether
others will necessarily view them that way.27 2 They could be consid-
ered involuntary because a permit holder must create them if he is to
receive a permit. Alternatively, one may think of them as voluntary
because a landowner or project proponent engages in the permitting
process willingly. The landowner is choosing to develop or change the
land of his own free will.
272. This dispute may seem like mere academic or semantic arguments until one looks
more closely at specific state statutes. In California, for example, the state con-
servation easement statute defines the arrangements as "voluntary." If exacted
conservation easements are not voluntary, then they may not be enforceable
under California's conservation easement statute. Although this would not auto-
matically invalidate an agreement, it would bring into question the long-term
viability of exacted conservation easements in California. Additionally, this term
may prove important when assessing circumstances in which an exaction of con-
servation easements may qualify as a taking under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Generally, a voluntary grant is not deemed a taking. Mere-
dith v. Talbot County, 560 A.2d 599 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). In Meredith, a
developer entered into an agreement to restrict land with a county's planning
officer. The developer received immediate plat approval in exchange for his
promise not to develop endangered species habit. Id. at 601-02. Later, the devel-
oper claimed that the environmental restriction on his land was a taking in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment because his promise to forego development was
made involuntarily (i.e., under duress). Id. The court concluded that although
the developer's decision was made under some threat of adverse governmental
action, the fact that the developer stood to receive something in return for his
promise gave rise to the inference that the agreement was not made under du-
ress. Id. at 604. Therefore, because the developer had voluntarily agreed to al-
low the county to restrict the use of his property, the county did not "take" his
property in violation of the Takings Clause. Id.
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"The definition of 'voluntariness' is fraught with conceptual and
linguistic challenges." 2 73 Some legal scholars characterize exactions
as voluntary,2 74 and others see them as coercive land-use controls. 2 75
Professor Kathleen Sullivan describes two schools of thought regard-
ing exactions: universal consensualism and universal coercionism.
Universal consenualism considers all exactions voluntary. Any arms-
length transaction based on full information in a competitive market
is "obviously voluntary" according to this theory. But Professor Sulli-
van points out that "so is the surrender of money to a highwayman
who says 'your money or your life."' 276 Alternatively, universal coer-
cionism draws upon the writings of Robert Hale and views all ex-
changes as coerced. 27 7 Both viewpoints would find the discussion here
futile because attempting to distinguish coercive and noncoercive ex-
changes is meaningless. 278 Professor Sullivan aptly explains that the
border between coercion and voluntary exchange is "elusive."2 79
Professor Andrea Peterson explains that whether one character-
izes an exaction as "involving either a forced deprivation of property or
a voluntary exchange depends upon one's view of what property the
claimant own[s]."280 She further explains that, under her proposed
definition of property, development exactions do not constitute a "Vol-
untary exchange." This holds true even where the exchange appears
voluntary. She provides the following example: "[S]uppose a local gov-
ernment enacted a law that provided, in effect, 'If you pay a fee to
support childcare centers, we will let you construct an office building
downtown.'" 28 ' Professor Peterson argues that despite appearances
this is involuntary because "the law deprives the developer of property
because it restricts her economically valuable freedom of action."28 2
This would be a forced transfer because it constrains the developer's
choices. She is left with the option of either (i) not developing and
thereby avoiding the childcare fee or (ii) paying the fee and developing
273. Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on
the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
3, 35-36 (1991).
274. See, e.g., Brad K. Schwartz, Note, Development Agreements: Contracting for
Vested Rights, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 719 (2001).
275. See, e.g., RIcHARD EPsTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 4 (1985).
276. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1446
(1989).
277. Id. at 1447.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1456.
280. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part
II-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification,
78 CAL. L. REV. 53, 77 (1991).




her office building. Her freedom of action is constrained because she
cannot simply construct the office building as she would otherwise
have a right to do. Professor Peterson describes this as restricting the
freedom to use one's land in an "economically valuable manner."28 3
The Supreme Court appeared to reject the notion that an exaction
is a voluntary exchange in Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion. 28 4 In Nollan, James and Marilyn Nollan objected to the permit
condition imposed by the California Coastal Commission. The couple
sought permission to rebuild their house, which was on beachfront
property. The Coastal Commission offered the Nollans a building per-
mit on the condition that they grant an easement across their property
for public access to the beach.285 The Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Scalia, invalidated the condition because it did not contain a
sufficient nexus between the permit condition and the governmental
purpose behind the Coastal Commission's building restriction. 28 6 In
the Court's discussion of the permit, it explained that exactions are
not voluntary exchanges. 28 7 Justice Scalia emphasized that unless ex-
actions have a clear nexus, they are not "valid regulations of land use
but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'" 28 8
In dissent, Justice Brennan asserted that the Nollans voluntarily
exchanged an easement for the right to build on their land. He analo-
gized the Nollans' situation to that of the pesticide manufacturers in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.289 In that case, Monsanto voluntarily
exchanged confidential data for the economic advantages of pesticide
registration. The majority in Nollan agreed that Monsanto involved a
voluntary exchange, but asserted that Nollan did not. Justice Scalia
does not describe why he views the Nollan exaction as involuntary. 290
Later cases have not taken on this discussion nor have they sought to
define "voluntary." However, subsequent scholarly writings have ac-
cepted Justice Scalia's framework and described exactions as
involuntary. 2 9 1
283. Id.
284. 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.2 (1987).
285. Id. at 827.
286. Id. at 837.
287. Id. at 833 n.2 ("[T]he announcement that the application for (or granting of) the
permit will entail the yielding of a property interest cannot be regarded as estab-
lishing [a] voluntary 'exchange .... '" (quoting Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1007 (1984))).
288. Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
289. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
290. As least one scholar has called the Nollan Court's characterization of exactions as
involuntary, "a radical reconception" of exactions. Kayden, supra note 273, at 37.
291. See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, Causation and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine:
Why the City of Tigard's Exaction Was a Taking, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 893, 903-04
(1995). In describing the exactment at issue in Nollan, Laitos notes that "[s]ince
the permit-for-a-right exchange was involuntary, and since the government had a
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Regardless of one's view of the voluntary nature of exactions, it is
clear that exacted conservation easements are not driven by the same
factors as traditional conservation easements. Studies of landowner
motivation for establishing conservation easements show that envi-
ronmental values and a desire to preserve the landscape are the chief
reasons for creating conservation easements. 2 92 A desire to develop or
change the land runs directly counter to these foundational justifica-
tions. Although a transaction may be a willing one, the exacted conser-
vation easements are created because someone else is dictating the
activities of the landowner/developer.
2. Exacted Conservation Easements Always Operate Under a
Larger Regulatory Structure
Exacted conservation easements, unlike traditional conservation
easements, always link to another law. This may be a local law, like a
zoning ordinance; a state law, like California's Environmental Quality
Act; or a federal law, like the Endangered Species Act. Donated and
sold conservation easements do not necessarily have these ties. Deci-
sions regarding their management and enforcement do not necessarily
extend into larger schemes of regulation and conservation. When con-
servation easements are exacted however, they carry out the purposes
of a regulatory scheme. This link between exacted conservation ease-
ments and regulatory schemes changes the character of conservation
easement management and enforcement. Conservation-minded citi-
zens and policymakers may be more interested in these conservation
easements, how they look, and how they function because of this inter-
action. Government entities are now using this tool to meet larger con-
servation goals like clean water and habitat protection. It is important
that these tools work towards achieving these important goals by be-
ing both viable and enforceable.
3. Exacted Conservation Easements May Not Need to Adhere to
State Conservation Easement Statutes
When federal agencies exact conservation easements, they want to
be sure that the exacted conservation easements meet the needs of the
federal law that they are being created in conjunction with. Unfortu-
nately, agencies are not always as careful about making sure the con-
servation easements follow state property law.29 3 For example, if the
monopoly on the supply of permits, there was no real consent to the waiver of the
right." Id.
292. ELCONIN & LuzADIs, supra note 217, at 9.
293. For example, I have heard anecdotal evidence that attorneys who negotiate fed-
eral permits do so based on federal goals and schemes. This seems to include
crafting perpetual conservation easements as a matter of course without looking
to whether that perpetuity element makes the conservation easement invalid
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FWS exacts conservation easements as part of a Habitat Conservation
Plan, it will generally want to ensure that those exacted conservation
easements adequately protect endangered species habitat. The goal of
those conservation easements should be to protect the land in a strin-
gent enough manner and for a long enough time to help continue the
long-term viability of the species in question. This may mean that the
FWS will want to negotiate perpetual conservation easements, or per-
haps restrict recreational access to the parcel in question. It also
seems likely that the FWS would want to prevent mining in sensitive
habitats. Unfortunately, state statutes regarding conservation ease-
ments may directly conflict with these goals. The question then be-
comes what the FWS does when state conservation easement statutes
directly conflict with the goals or desires of federal environmental
laws using conservation easements.
It may not be necessary for exacted conservation easements based
on a federal scheme to follow state statutes. Unfortunately, the case
law addressing this issue is minimal and not very clear. In United
States v. Albrecht,29 4 the Eighth Circuit held that conservation ease-
ments negotiated and held by the FWS did not have to conform to
state law because they were part of a federal scheme. The conserva-
tion easements at issue were created under the Migratory Bird Hunt-
ing Stamp Act (the "Duck Stamp Act"). The Duck Stamp Act
authorizes the FWS to hold partial interests in land to protect the
habitat of migratory birds.295 Based on that authorization, the FWS
purchased conservation easements over prairie potholes and other
types of wetlands throughout the Midwest. The Albrechts acquired fee
title to land encumbered by a waterfowl management easement. 2 96
Although they were not originally party to the easement agreement,
they had actual and constructive notice of the restrictions when they
took ownership.29 7 The restriction, entitled an "Easement for Water-
fowl Management Rights," prohibited draining and permitting drain-
ing of designated waterfowl protection areas. Essentially, prairie
potholes on the Albrechts' land would fill with water and serve as
under state conservation easement statutes. This would not necessarily mean
that the instrument is unenforceable or nontransferable, it simply means that
the state conservation easement statute cannot serve as a basis for enforcing the
law. Instead, to enforce such agreements one would have to look to state statutes
regarding easements, equitable servitudes, and restrictive covenants. If there
are no statutes in these areas because these are traditionally common law
realms, then one would look to state common law to see if the servitude is
enforceable.
294. 496 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1974).
295. 16 U.S.C. § 718d(c) (2005) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to acquire
"small wetland and pothole areas [and] interests therein" for the purpose of pro-
tecting bird habitats).




habitat for migratory birds. At some point, these potholes were
drained2 98 thereby robbing them of significance as meaningful water-
fowl habitat.299
The Albrechts argued the waterfowl easement was invalid because
it was not specifically allowed under North Dakota law.300 The court
characterized the restriction as "an easement in gross for the benefit
of the United States and to run indefinitely ... "301 Despite this des-
ignation however, the court felt that determining the appropriate la-
bel for the restriction was "immaterial."30 2 The court did not concern
itself with the state law questions, and thus did not determine
whether North Dakota law does indeed permit only statutorily defined
rights in land, nor did it determine whether North Dakota servitude
law prohibited the specific agreement in question. Instead, the court
concluded that federal law applied because it believed that where
state law is "aberrant" or "hostile" to federal property rights, it is not
controlling.30 3 The Eighth Circuit found it unnecessary to explore the
state law questions because if they were at all hostile to the federal
property rights in the waterfowl easement, they would not have pre-
cluded the conveyance of the disputed property right. The court
stated:
We fully recognize that laws of real property are usually governed by the par-
ticular states; yet the reasonable property right conveyed to the United States
in this case effectuates an important national concern, the acquisition of nec-
essary land for waterfowl production areas, and should not be defeated by any
possible North Dakota law barring the conveyance of this property right. To
hold otherwise would be to permit the possibility that states could rely on
local property laws to defeat the acquisition of reasonable rights to their citi-
zens' pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 718d(c) and to destroy a national program of
acquiring property to aid in the breeding of migratory birds. We, therefore,
specifically hold that the property right conveyed to the United States in this
case, whether or not deemed a valid easement or other property right under
North Dakota law, was a valid conveyance under federal law and vested in the
United States the rights as stated therein. Section 718d(c) specifically allows
the United States to acquire wetland and pothole areas and the interests
therein.3
0 4
298. Id. at 909. The use of passive voice here is purposeful. Many of the potholes in
the region had been drained via an excavated drainage ditch running through
multiple properties. The FWS was unable to determine who had created this
ditch and did not accuse the Albrechts of causing the drainage. However, the
easement not only prohibits draining the waterfowl habitat, but also says that
the landowner cannot permit draining.
299. Id.
300. Id. Although North Dakota law may not specifically allow such an easement, it is
not clear if it is specifically forbidden. The Albrechts argued that North Dakota
law only permits statutorily established rights. The Eighth Circuit did not rule
on whether this was an accurate interpretation of state law.






The Supreme Court of the United States has supported the idea
that federally negotiated conservation easements do not need to ad-
here to state law. In North Dakota v. United States,305 the Court as-
sessed the validity of a North Dakota law limiting the FWS' ability to
negotiate desired waterfowl easements. Congress amended the Duck
Stamp Act in 1958 to enable the FWS to acquire partial interests in
land such as the waterfowl easement at issue in Albrecht. Although
North Dakota originally consented to this process, hostility toward the
federal government led the North Dakota legislature to pass a law re-
stricting these easements in 1977.306
The law established three restrictions. First, it required the gover-
nor to submit proposed wetland acquisition for approval by the board
in the county where the wetland is located. Associated with this ap-
proval, both the FWS and the county (with funding from FWS) must
provide a "detailed impact analysis." If the county does not approve
the acquisition, the governor cannot approve it. Second, the statute
authorized landowners to negotiate easement terms, specifically ena-
bling owners to restrict the duration of the easement. Further, the
statute permits landowners to "drain any after-expanded wetlands or
water area in excess of the legal description." 30 7 Third, the statute
restricted the easements to a maximum term of ninety-nine years.308
These rules essentially prevented the FWS from acquiring any inter-
ests in wetlands post 1977.
The FWS sought declaratory judgment that North Dakota's statute
was invalid because it was hostile to federal law.30 9 The Supreme
Court held that North Dakota could not restrict the federal govern-
ment's ability to acquire easements and prohibited the North Dakota
legislature from placing any restrictions on acquisition that directly
conflict with federal goals.31o Essentially, the federally negotiated and
held easements conflicted with the state law. But, the state law was
preempted by the federal law because it directly conflicted with it. Sig-
nificantly, the Court based its analysis on the fact that the governor of
North Dakota had consented to the federal government's ability to ac-
quire easements. The governor's attempt to withdraw consent and the
North Dakota Legislature's attempt to limit the easement agreements
were invalid. Where state and federal law conflict, federal law takes
precedence. 3 1 1 This bodes well for exacted conservation easements.
305. 460 U.S. 300 (1983).
306. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 20.1-02-18.1 to -18.2 (1978), as amended by 1979 N.D. Laws
ch. 553 § 11.
307. Id.
308. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-02.1.
309. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 309.
310. Id. at 319.
311. This principle arises out of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which pro-
vides: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
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One could draw upon the theories from Albrecht and North Dakota
to argue that federally negotiated exacted conservation easements
that conflict with state law should nonetheless be valid agree-
ments. 3 12 However, the argument may not be persuasive without the
two elements that unify these cases. First, the Duck Stamp Act specif-
ically mentions and authorizes partial interests in land.3 13 Second,
these easements not only arose under a federal program, but they
were held by the federal government. Other federal statutes involved
in conservation easement exaction do not generally even mention con-
servation easements. The first references to conservation easements
are usually in the regulations, and sometimes, they are not even men-
tioned there. Under the Endangered Species Act, for example, conser-
vation easements do not appear in the statute or the regulations. They
are not mentioned until regulatory guidance in the form of the HCP
Handbook, issued in 1996. It is difficult to argue that such conserva-
tion easements preempt state law when the federal statutes them-
selves do not discuss conservation easements. The Duck Stamp Act is
one of the few laws that specifically authorizes partial interests in
land. This specific mention of partial interest in land in the Duck
Stamp Act may be enough to preempt state law.3 14
Also persuasive, however, is the fact that the federal government
held the conservation easements at issue.3 15 Thus, the Property
Clause of the Constitution came into play. The federal government's
rights as an owner are different from those of ordinary proprietors. 3 16
Unfortunately, the language of the decision is not clear enough to de-
termine what would happen if the federal government were not the
holder but the conservation easements were based on a federal
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
312. See also United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (hold-
ing that state mining law did not apply to reservations agreed to by the United
States).
313. See supra note 298.
314. Accord U.S. Army Legal Servs. Agency, USALSA Report: Environmental Law Di-
vision Notes: Land Use Control and Federal Common Law in Real Property
Transfers, 2000 ARMY LAw. 43 (2000) (endorsing the idea that these cases may
provide some basis for allowing federally held conservation easements that con-
flict with state law, but cautioning against relying on this argument in absence of
a federal law specifically mentioning partial interest in land).
315. This conclusion is supported by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Johansen,
93 F.3d 459, 463 (8th Cir. 1996) ("State law will generally govern the interpreta-
tion of a real property conveyance instrument... so long as it is neither aberrant
nor hostile to federal property rights." (citing Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. at 591-96)).
316. Richard H. Cowart & Sally K. Fairfax, Public Lands Federalism: Judicial Theory
and Administrative Reality, 15 EcoLoGY L.Q. 375 (1988).
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scheme. There is a good argument that any conservation easements
negotiated under a federal scheme may conflict with state law if the
conflict is necessary to meet the goals of the federal statute involved.
This follows the reasoning of the doctrine of conflict preemption.
Conservation easements exacted under state laws may also be able
to escape adherence to state property laws based on their status as
exactions. This will vary by state. Thus, we see that traditional con-
servation easements and exacted conservation easements differ in a
few key aspects. First, they stem from very different justifications.
Second, exacted conservation easements always arise in a larger regu-
latory context. There is an undeniable intersection with exacted con-
servation easements and environmental and land-use laws.
Traditional conservation easements may grow out of a regulatory
framework also. Indeed, they may operate directly in support of envi-
ronmental law goals. However, they do not necessarily do so. It is a
not a requirement for a traditional conservation easement as it is for
exacted conservation easements. Finally, exacted conservation ease-
ments do not always adhere to state conservation easement laws.
Drafters of exacted conservation easements may be more focused on
meeting the goals of the underlying land-use regulation than satisfy-
ing state property law requirements. Further, where the underlying
law is a federal one, there is a tenuous argument that the exacted
conservation easements need not conform to state law in order to be
enforceable. These key differences heighten enforceability and en-
forcement concerns. The difference in motivation may mean that land-
owners are not as keen to make sure the agreements stay in place and
are adhered to. The involvement of the regulatory structure argues for
heightened public interest in enforcement because exacted conserva-
tion easements represent public programs. Finally, the intersection
between exacted conservation easements and state conservation ease-
ment laws may trigger enforceability concerns. When exacted conser-
vation easements do not adhere either to state conservation easement
laws or to other state property law, their enforceability is less certain.
Even where based on federal law, the circumstances where exacted
conservation easements can defy state law appear limited. Thus, these
differences between traditional conservation easements and exacted
conservation easements lead directly to significant concerns with the
tool.
VI. CONCLUSION
If conservation easements are voluntary, private agreements made
by groups or individuals seeking to protect land outside of a govern-
mental context, exacted conservation easements are the opposite. Ex-
acted conservation easements do not arise out of personal motivations
to protect land or conserve species. Exacted conservation easements
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do not result in charitable tax deductions. Instead, exacted conserva-
tion easements are a government tool-negotiated and often held by
government entities. They are not entered into willingly; landowners
are coerced into creating or contributing to these conservation
easements.
As we can see, the differences between conservation easements and
exacted conservation easements means that exacted conservation
easements do not further the goals that served as the basis for the
emergence of conservation easements. Exacted conservation ease-
ments do not generally represent freedom of contract because they are
direct outgrowths of environmental and land-use regulation. There is
heavy government involvement in the creation of exacted conservation
easements. Exacted conservation easements further the goals of fed-
eral environmental statutes. These are the very statutes that were
seen as dissatisfying and overly intrusive by the original champions of
conservation easements. Conservation easements were a tool used to
avoid federal regulation. Now, the tool is an aspect of federal regula-
tion. Many of the reasons why state legislatures created conservation
easements statutes and why their use proliferated are in exact opposi-
tion to the basis of exacted conservation easements.
If, as I argue above, conservation easements have emerged as a
popular tool in part because of the desirability of private tools to con-
serve land, exacted conservation easements directly conflict with that
sentiment. Do people want conservation easements because they be-
lieve that individuals should be able to make private agreements in
perpetuity regarding their land? Because conservation easements re-
present agreements between private individuals where government
need not interfere? If so, then owners would not like exacted conserva-
tion easements. If, however, conservation easements are merely an ac-
knowledgement of property being a series of rights that can be held by
different parties, then exacted conservation easements make sense.
They are not private agreement but public agreements.
One of the most disruptive elements of the difference between ex-
acted conservation easements and more traditional conservation ease-
ments is the fact that conservation easements are being exacted
without examining these differences. There is a sharp interplay here
between freedom of contract and property rights that has gone un-
studied. Many different groups favored conservation easements and
their use extended into different areas without consideration of
whether that extension was appropriate. Conservation easement stat-
utes did not contemplate these exactions, and state legislators largely
did not discuss the implications. Governments are using this tradi-
tional tool in a new way extensively throughout the country, without
consideration of the appropriateness or long-term viability of the re-
sulting agreements.
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